

US Pakistan's Relations under Khan 1958-69: Impact on South Asia

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ABSTRACT

In international relations, neither there are eternal friends nor foes; the only thing which remains eternal, is the national interest of nation-states, pursued to serve under circumstances and changing orders. This paper is an attempt to highlight in detail the nature of relationship between US and Pakistan under President General Ayub Khan (1958 to 1969) and under the framework of foreign policy analysis as well as core-periphery bilateralism of the hey-day of the bloc politics and its impact on South Asia. An Attempt will also be made to highlight and critically examine the relationship under the characteristics of US-Pakistan relationship and the major factors which have been accountable for the close security and economic alignment between the two countries over the said period and the aid Pakistan received from the US under the Foreign Assistance Act 1961 and its implications for South Asia. Research efforts will be made to highlight the nature of relationship under the core-periphery relationship with a special focus on the characteristics of US-Pakistan relationship which in large have been dependent and of asymmetrical nature.

KEY WORDS: Nation-states, de facto regimes, core-periphery relationship, system theory, Bilateralism, militarism in politics, praetorian ruler type role, collective Security arrangements, A non-representative government, crisis of legitimacy, Pivotal Statecraft, Kashmir issue, SEATO and CENTO, unnatural alliances, qualified Neutrality.

Introduction

Hans J. Morgenthau argues that “no nation can have a sure guide as to what it must do and what it need not do in foreign policy without accepting the national interest as that guide.” John Foster Dulles, the US Secretary of State in relative terms has stated that “there are several de facto regimes in the world that we do

not recognize. We act, in this respect, as our national interests dictate” (Dulles, 1959:172). Thus foreign policy of a country is the patterns of relationship that it establishes with the outside world, for the promotion of its national interests. It is the action of a state towards the external environment and conditions under which (foreign) actions are formulated. Foreign Policy is also a synthesis of the ends (national interests) and means (power and capabilities) of nation states. The interaction between national goals and the resources for attaining them is the perennial subject of state craft. A similar definition of foreign policy is “the product of a complex interplay of the requirements of history, geography, past and present experiences, national interests, and its domestic compulsions (Peshawari, 1999: 540). The relationship of a nation-state is the result of foreign policy, it adapts.

Major Characteristics of Bilateralism

Asymmetrical Core-Periphery Relationship

The relationship between two have traditionally been based on core-periphery nature and are being asymmetrical. The nature of such relationship can be well defined under system theory that the nation-states being the leading actors in international system are divided into three categories of core/developed/first world, semi-periphery/ developing/ second world and periphery/underdeveloped/third world. First World Countries are rich and advanced economically and industrially, having high defense and income capabilities. The political system of first world is in large representative and supported by good governance. They are the leading donors and directly control the leading financial/debt international institutions such as International Monetary Fund, World Bank, Paris Club etc. Second World is developing in technology and economic development being not very independent in its pursuit of foreign policy. Foreign policy of a semi-periphery with a representative system is comparatively independent and marked with satisfactory governance than the one without.

Peripheries in system theory are those which are economically, industrially and politically not advanced or developed. Majority of Third World Countries are marked with non-representative or pseudo democratic process with foreign policy handicaps. Under the system theory, foreign policy of a country without a representative system and huge foreign debt is least independent. In such a situation, the relationship between the core and periphery are not interdependent but rather dependent or asymmetrical. Dependency is a leading indicator of the core-periphery relationship.

Robert Gilpin, a realist due to his focus on power politics says that a dominant power defines the rules of the international system and makes its repercussions for small powers in redefining its foreign policy (Gilpin, 1981: 22). The relationship between US and Pakistan are no exception to the general rule. Right from the

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early days of the relationship between the two in 1950s to post-9/11 period, US have defined its rules of the system for Pakistan in favour of its own interests. It is particularly in the period of 9/11 where US having emerged as a sole power, is behaving more as a hegemon than partner in its relationship with developing and developed countries. As Chalmers Johnson analyzes in his recent book *Sorrows of the Empire: Militarism, Secrecy and End of a Republic* that US with its 969 military bases inside US and 725 around the world, is behaving like an empire with the fact that it now needs a revolution to revive its Pentagon back under the democratic control as happened in past. The Wilsonian model based on the principles of George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, and James Monero that American should not interfere in the outside region and make hemisphere deemed for peace and security are gone days.

Pakistan-A True US Ally

Another characteristic of US-Pakistan relationship is the role of Pakistan as a true and sincere ally which American administration has both ignored and least honoured over the years. Pakistan at the cost of its core interests supported US policies in the region, but in return US adapted double standards and abandoned its ally in distress. Right from the early days of relationship when Liaquat Ali Khan ignoring the scheduled visit to Moscow, abandoned it for Washington DC to its U- turn on Afghanistan in 2001 Pakistan has supported all deals and directions with sincerity and dedication. Pakistan joined the two alliances SEATO and CENTO, tacked together by U.S. in a fit of what was called Pactomania. Pakistan provided American bases in Peshawar in 1959 for intelligence and surveillance purpose. The consequences of which resulted in U-2 incident which brought Pakistan in direct confrontation with USSR. A diplomatic row erupted between two countries. The U-2 aircraft incident indeed created security hazards for Pakistan. The plane was shot down by the Russians and its pilot, Francis Gary Powers, arrested on its soil. The Soviet Premier Khrushchev warned Pakistan of its consequences as the plane had flown from the Pakistani soil from the facilities, it afforded to US for surveillance and intelligence purposes. The base was closed in 1968 after it denied the extension of the contract for another decade to US.

Pakistan joined CENTO and SEATO in large unnecessarily in hope of pleasing American boss. They made an imbalance in Pakistan's alliance with the western countries as well their own standing (Burke, 1973: 240). As Mushtaq Ahmad describes the joining of two alliances brought Pakistan from qualified neutrality to unqualified alliance. In his words, "The repercussions of our membership of SEATO and CENTO were felt on our relations with all the countries with which we maintained diplomatic ties, especially the ones favourable disposed towards us. Whatever might have been the other motives in pursuing such a policy, these were outweighed by economic assistance and military aid" (Ahmed, 1968: 278). For Pakistan, they merely proved paper tiger or paper alliance. The joining of two alliances reflected on its foreign policy over the

entire field of its foreign relations (*Ibid*: 38). Our relationship with a large number of nation-states turned cold after we joined these two alliances. It did not serve our basic purpose of defense against Indian aggression. Pakistan need from the pacts assurance of mutual defense in case of an aggression, feared from India, which was denied to it under the two pacts.

In Mushtaq Ahmad's analysis, "The collective security arrangements to which we were a party were not collective enough to protect against the threat to our security from any source, particularly India" (*Ibid*, 1995: 278). Pakistan's hopes, as perceived in wider analysis, were thwarted after US declined to afford her any help or rescue in the war of 1965, against India under the provisions of SEATO, in pursuance of Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement, was demonstrative of its legal and moral betrayal" (*Ibid*: 160). Pakistan had signed with a bilateral security agreement which called upon US to take such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces. This was a total act of subordination on Pakistan's part because the commitment was restricted to instances of communist aggression. It made no reference to US coming to Pakistan's help in the event of a conflict with its most likely adversary, i.e. India.

Support for Military and Controlled Democracies

The relationship between US and Pakistan is marked by the fact that US has supported in large military regimes and controlled democracies in Pakistan rather than a true representative system. Pakistan which unfortunately for the longer period has been run under military regimes and controlled democracies owe to the statement of John F. Dulles, US Secretary of State under D. D. Eisenhower (1953-59) and architect of SEATO and CENTO that *there are several de facto regimes in the world that we do not recognize. We act, in this respect, as our national interests dictate.* Consequently, the American Administrations have shown more support to coup makers, dictators and pseudo democrats than popular representative governments in Pakistan. The bilateral relationship of US-Pakistan since 1958 is witnessed to the fact that Pakistan has received more foreign aid when it was under military or military-turned civilian ruler than public representatives. While the representative government i. e. between 1970-77 and 1988-99 met more defiance and sanctions/threats from the State Department and Administrations.

A non-representative government in Pakistan at large serves the interests of US. For example, from 1979 to 1988 Pakistan fought the American cold war against Soviet Union. Knowing well that Afghan crisis of the late 1980s could have destructive consequences for Pakistan; its rulers (the generals) became willing instruments of Americans. This resulted in Pakistan's becoming a center of mercenaries, illegal arms and heroin. Had there been a civilian government, it might not have been possible as the issues could be open to debate in public and on the floor of legislatures.

Pakistan's foreign policy in the formative years after independence being neutral and non-aligned without any ideological choice, was soon under the necessity of by virtue of the stark reality of dependence on US for security, economic and even political reasons. Having an important geo-strategic location in South Asia, major challenges to Pakistan's survival as the nation-state came from the legacies of the politics of the sub-continent in which Pakistan's disputes and confrontations with India and Afghanistan, especially confrontation with India over Kashmir and the dispute over division of the waters of the Indus basin, were no doubt central in shopping Pakistan's foreign policy. Similarly, Soviet designs for 'expansionism' in South Asian region could not be ruled out, particularly after the nationalization of Iranian oil by Mossadeq in March 1951 and growing leftist designs that precipitated the crisis of Western power in Middle East. Soviet influence had started permeating Afghanistan in the shape of economic aid. They all were ultimately accountable for the profound changes having taken place in the strategic military situation in the region in the early 1950s that brought about a crucial shift in US regional military calculations and its relationship with Pakistan. Pakistan joined SEATO and CENTO actually more as a threat against India than communism. Two alliances were tacked together by US in a fit of what was called Pactomania. Pakistan continued joining two alliances under Ayub Khan as a part of his defensive foreign policy, a kind of foreign policy designed by a state against the war under the intention of protecting country from foreign aggression of offensive states. In fact, it had two-fold impact on foreign relationship under Gen. Ayub Khan. First, he inherited a pro-US foreign relationship. The direction of which since the fifties forcefully advocated country's participation in British-sponsored Middle East Defense Organization-MEDO- which later became popularly known as Baghdad Pact and associated hope of foreign assistance from the US. Ayub Khan himself gives reasons for the alliance in his political autobiography, *Friends Not Masters*. He says that it would bring together like-minded Islamic countries such as Turkey, the then Royal Iraq and Iran. In general's strategic scheme, of things, this geopolitical combination could be a well significant step towards a larger unity of Islamic states. Baghdad Pact, however, met with hostility by Arab nationalists and Egypt and Syria opposed it as an imperialist conspiracy against the Arab world. Even pro-west Saudi Arabia and Hashmite Kingdom of Jordan and Lebanon stayed out of alliance. And the matters came to a head when Anglo-French-Israeli invasion was launched, triggering the Suez war in 1956. Since Britain had joined the invasion, there was a public out cry in Pakistan against Middle East Pact, demanding Pakistan's withdrawal from it. Successive governments of Pakistan still clanged to the pact even after the revolutionary government of Iraq had quit it.

Secondly, Ayub suffered from the crisis of legitimacy. He like many Pakistani rulers (who entered power through back doors and ruled the country for longer period), depended on US support for internal as well as external reasons. Ayub Khan (1904-74)'s access to power in October 1958 was the ultimate result

of political chaos and lack of good political leadership in the country. Political rumblings and instability tarnished the image of Pakistan abroad. Having served in the Cabinet of Governor General, Ghulam Mohammad as an unformed Defense Minister, Ayub cherished the whims of a strong praetorian ruler and believed in the promotion of strong relationship with US. It was actually initiated by Ghulam Mohammad as the Finance Minister.

Pakistan's Foreign Policy under went rapid changes under Ayub Khan. It was the ultimate result of Pakistan's need for security and development as well as preservation of its ideology, the core principles of its government. Foreign policy of Pakistan after Ayub Khan drifted from past. Ayub Khan adapted a policy more consistent than it was in the past due to frequent changes in ministries and governments (Burke, *op.cit*: 212). Ayub Khan was in better position to take independent decisions and even comparatively could frame a policy of own, no matter the major sources of which were personal or bureaucratic, because of economic and political stability (though unrepresentative but political chaos was over) (Hindu weekly, 1963, August). Ayub Khan expressed his view in an article "Stresses and Strains" in January 1964 in which he said that Pakistan was "America's most allied ally in Asia" being the only Asian country of joining SEATO and CENTO, it brought closer to US. The Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson visited Pakistan in May 1961 (Khan, 1964). His visit was followed by Ayub Khan's visit to US. Johnson paid another visit to Pakistan as President in 1968. He reached Pakistan during his visit to South East Asia including US military base in Camranh in South Vietnam. He met Ayub Khan and congratulated him for the economic development, he made during his rule. He being the architect of Pakistan's policy of close alignment with United States signed a number of bilateral economic and military agreements with United States, including a 10 year agreement providing US military, communications and intelligence facilities in Peshawar, NWFP, Pakistan.

Ayub like a praetorian ruler suffered from the crisis of legitimacy, a factor accountable for his dependency on US for internal support, other than security integration Pakistan actually was in need and sought shelter under SEATO and CENTO. The crisis of legitimacy in Pakistan is one of the major factors accountable for instability and lack of system building in Pakistan, for which we as a nation have been paying the price for. It is the tragedy of our history that those who ruled the country for the longer period entered politics through back doors. The crisis of legitimacy, one of the five crises of political development in a nation-state (crisis of identity, participation/ distribution, representation and Penetration) persisting with higher ratio makes a society chaotic and distrustful of government. Foreign policy of a country without representative system tilts towards a super power.

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Alignment with West

Hasan Askari tracing the 57 years of Pakistan's Foreign Policy or Pakistan's relationship with outside world divides the entire period into seven phases. They are:

- i. Exploration and Friendship with All 1947-53
- ii. Alignment with the West 1953-62
- iii. Transition 1962-71
- iv. Bilateralism and Non-Alignment 1972-79
- v. Afghanistan and Partnership with US 1979-1990
- vi. Post-Cold War Era and Pakistan's Dilemmas 1990-2001
- vii. 2001 onwards Counter-terrorism

In this paper, second and third period are discussed in detail.

Pakistan stretched its hands of friendship with US from beginning when it's Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan declined the Soviet offer to visit Moscow and instead went to Washington DC. Pakistan was the first country in South Asia to sign an agreement with US which entered into force December 15, 1950. US was the first country which offered Pakistan for financial aid soon after the independence. Pakistan requested the US for \$ 2 billion for military and financial aid. The letter by Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah contained in the memorandum of Oct. 1947 was conveyed to Laik Ali, Special Emissary of Jinnah. A need was shown of \$170,000,000 for army, air force \$75,000,000 and Navy \$60,000,000, \$700 million for industrial development, \$700 million for agricultural development and \$510 million was sought for defence etc (Brown, 1972: 32). Pakistan's quest for economic assistance, as Mohammad Ayoob discusses in his research article was a leading factor in the determination of its relationship with the US (Ayoob, 1995: 498).

In retrospect, Richard Nixon visited Pakistan in 1953 as the US Vice President. On 14 May 1956, Stephen P. Dorsey, Deputy Regional Director for NEA, ICA came to Pakistan In his words "Turning to Pakistan, we find a country which has taken a clear stand at our side in unconditional opposition to Communist aggression (Arif, 1984: 156). President Ayub Khan soon after stepping into power as the Chief of Army Staff and de facto President of the country spoke in longer run, in terms of friendship between two. In his article in *Pakistan Perspective* of President Ayub Khan published in Foreign Affairs in July 1960, he wrote: "The next 15 to 20 years are going to be most crucial for Pakistan. Either we make the grade in this period or we do not. If we fail to make the grade, we are bound to submerge under tidal wave of communism which is constantly lashing its fury all around us. Since we do not seek this fate, we must move forward and do so quickly. It is here that our eyes turn towards our friends and allies" (*Ibid*). Pakistan became closer to US during second phase of their foreign policy when it depended on American support for political and economic aid.

Pakistan-US Bilateral Agreement 1959

Treaty between the two countries was the major treaty signed between Ayub regime and US administration. The treaty was based on the agreements upon which the two countries agreed to associate themselves in London in July 28, 1958 (Hussain, 1979: 12). It was a short documented treaty comprising of 6 articles which stood for better future cooperation. US government acknowledged the necessity of extending its hands of friendship as “vital to its national interest and to world peace, the preservation of the independence and integrity of Pakistan.” Article 1 made it incumbent on US government that in case of any aggression against Pakistan, the former would take “such appropriate action, including the use of armed forces, as may mutually agreed upon and permissible under US Constitution.”

Treaty of Friendship and Commerce

Treaty of Friendship and Commerce was signed between Pakistan and the United States on 12 November 1959 (came into effect in 1961). Comprising of 11 articles, treaty was major a concord having been signed between two countries. In S.M. Haider's words, “treaty was the outcome of a desire on part of both US and Pakistan to strengthen relations. Treaty in general, was based upon the principles of national and most favoured nation treatment (Haider, 1995:517). The agreement provided permission to the nationals of two countries to enter, reside and travel in each other's country. Treaty provided each other a most favoured nation treatment.

It contained another provision that the nationals and companies of either party shall be permitted to engage in scientific, educational, religious and philanthropic activities with in the territory of other party. They were allowed to form non-political associations for that purpose subject, of course, to the laws of land where the association is constituted.

It was a good example of bilateralism in commerce. An outstanding feature of the treaty was, the article concerning the settlement of disputes. Those disputes which parties do not satisfactorily adjust by diplomacy, shall be submitted to International Court of Justice, unless the parties agree to settlement by some other pacific means. The treaty gave permission to the parties to conduct their activities freely in respect of enterprises which nationals and companies of either party were allowed to establish or acquire with in the territories of the other. Most-favoured nation treatment appeared also in case of commercial travelers, representing national and companies of either party, engaged in business with in the territories of other party during their sojourn there in. Most-favoured nation treatment, in such cases, has application in respect of customs and other matters including taxes and charges applicable to them.

The treaty provided national treatment in the application of laws and regulations with in the territories of the other party to establish compulsory systems of social security and pecuniary compensation on account of disease,

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injury or death arising out of and in the course of employment (*Ibid*). One of the particular aims of the agreement as decided between the two counterparts, William M. Rountree and Hafizur Rehman was the encouragement of American investment in Pakistan (The Pakistan Times, 2005, July 18). The clauses of the treaty were applauded by Eisenhower when he visited Pakistan on December 7-8, 1960. His visit (first by any US head of state), was given a nation-wide welcome. It reminded and confirmed his statement on the eve of signing of wheat aid bill, passed by Congress for Pakistan, *We are proud to have such staunch friends as the people of Pakistan* (Burke, *op.cit*: 162). Bill was approved and signed with in the recorded period of Congress legislative history and 9,860 tons of wheat was sailed to Karachi from Baltimore. President Eisenhower was decorated with *Nishan-e-Imtiaz*. The communiqué by Pakistan government before his arrival said, "Pakistan has been looking forward joyously to receive you because more than anybody else in this age, you symbolize in your person, the dynamic manifestation and working of principles of universal peace, freedom and goodwill.

Chinese Factor in two Relationships

The growing relationship between China and Pakistan in 1960s appeared as a thorn in two sides' relationship. A major agreement between China and US was the Air Agreement between the two sides for airlines of two, over each other's territories. Soon after the treaty, US postponed \$4,300,000 loan to Pakistan for the improvement of Decca International Airport. A report in American press regarded the agreement/move as "an unfortunate breach of free world solidarity" and reverse the efforts to strengthen the security and stability of Sub-Continent which the Chinese communists wished to prevent. Washington Post published an article, stating that "*We look upon this as an unfortunate breach of free world solidarity and take a dim view of it*" (*The Washington Post*, 1913, March). The link in later years served as a channel of communication between China and US. Similarly, the ratification of final agreement on Delimitation and Demarcation of Sinkiang on Kashmir border was not liked by US administration. The seven article treaty with a preamble served as a mile stone between Pakistan and China for future bilateral treaties. A loan of \$60,000,000, to Pakistan from China was signed in the same period. It was an attractive loan for Pakistan which was interest free and was to be paid to China over 20 years with in 10 years (grace period in Pakistani exports). US administration showed its concern on developing Pak-Chinese relationship.

Kennedy's Initiatives for Kashmir

Kennedy Administration believed in the strategy of making peace between India and Pakistan. This strategy was called Pivotal Statecraft. Kennedy's

Administration adapted a strategy for making peace between India and Pakistan in 1963 --- an essential way to keep peace in South Asia by bringing two rivals together on Kashmir problem. The strategy was based on a simple principle of "pivotal" statecraft. It assumed that India and Pakistan's, the two neighbour at war and cold war, their mutual need for US support would lead them to curry US favour by showing flexibility on Kashmir. President J. F. Kennedy soon after taking office showed his keenness to solve the major conflict in South Asia. America could not provide military aid to India due to its alliance with Pakistan, under the strategy it could. Pivotal Strategy devolved on the fact that once US began to give India military aid against China in 1962, while continuing to arm Pakistan its archenemy, it seemed well positioned to play as pivot between them. Both sides were eager to enlist and maintain US support, and neither could face with equanimity the loss of that support. Accordingly, the Administration believed that India's and Pakistan's desire to secure US support, coupled with their pressing need for that support, would lead to an "ingratiating contest" in which both would try to curry US favour by making compromises on Kashmir. It however, did not work out. The viability of the strategy depended on two things. First, neither side became convinced that the pivot's support was guaranteed. Second, that both sides did not have attractive alternative sources of support. Neither of these conditions was met during the bilateral talks on Kashmir that were initiated under US auspices in late 1962. US undertook a "campaign in depth" approach by not only taking to Nehru but also to tier 2 & tier 3 leaders and opinion formers to convince them of the fact that US assistance could only be guaranteed to India if the Kashmir dispute was resolved. US military aid was of such a quantity and quality that it could only be used to "hold" the Chinese and not to recover any Indian territory captured by Chinese, as NSC staffer Carl Kaysen put it, the package was designed to "combine a respectable amount of aid to Indians with a continuation of pressure on them to improve their relations with Pakistan".

Under US pressure and tutelage, India and Pakistan held six rounds of negotiations, between December 1962 and May 1963, to settle the Kashmir issue. But no concrete results came out.

Conclusion

The relationship between two countries started developing soon after the independence of Pakistan. Pakistan having emerged on world map with surrounding problems, had a quest for financial and economic aid for a number of reasons for which it applied to US. Liaquat Ali Khan and those at the helms of affairs, including senior bureaucrats showed a tilt to US. The relationship under Ayub Khan period witnessed a considerable growth between two --- better known as Alignment with the West and Transition period in which Pakistan became more depended on Pakistan. Pakistan by entering SEATO and CENTO drifted from

qualified neutrality to unqualified alliance. The alliances were neither our necessity nor requirement, and if were, they did not satisfy our needs. Pakistan wanted and needed from CENTO a unified command as Turkey did under NATO or from SEATO a defense against aggression no matter from which corner (India), it comes. Ayub Khan entered politics through a military coup and tried to gain legitimacy by unconstitutional and unrepresentative methods. Under the situation, where a ruler lacks popular sources of support rulers, tilts towards a major power for internal and external support. Pakistan enjoyed economic and military assistance from US, one of the factors accountable for its dependency on US.

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