

## **The Role of Metaphors in U.S. Foreign Policy: Global Leadership and the Carter Administration**

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### **Abstract**

*Attention to metaphor usage by political leaders can lead to a fuller understanding of the political process in U.S. foreign policy. However, metaphorical analyses of foreign policy have focused more on metaphors as rhetorical or legitimating devices rather than as cognitive “guides” for officials. In this light, the article assesses the usefulness of the metaphorical approach for understanding foreign policy by examining U.S. global leadership during the Carter Administration. The study begins by describing the evolution in metaphorical thinking by President Carter, his National Security Adviser, and his Secretary of State. Then the study explains the policymakers’ stability and change in metaphorical thinking over time. The findings indicate change in metaphorical thinking from optimistic to more pessimistic imagery during the administration. In addition, this change coincided with a shift in global leadership during the Carter years, reflecting a role for metaphors as cognitive guides through the foreign policy terrain.*

**Keywords:** Foreign policy, metaphors, cognitive psychology, problem framing, carter administration, cold war

### **1. Introduction**

Metaphorical analyses of foreign policy have been rather limited, focusing more on metaphors as rhetorical and/or legitimating devices rather than as cognitive “guides” for officials (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1991; Houghton, 2009; Carpenter, 2013; Alden & Aran, 2012; Stevens, 2012). However, metaphors used by political officials can reveal how those speakers conceive of politics (Shimko, 1994; Brenner, 2010; Jian-hua, 2010; Suedfeld, 2010; Qingmin, 2011; Oppermann & Spencer, 2013). To understand how and why metaphors may have consequences, one needs to begin with the work of cognitive psychologists, which focuses on how people deal with the complexities and ambiguities of the world that surrounds them. Among the tools that people use to make sense of their world are metaphorical reasoning. When people need to understand one aspect of their environment that might be abstract or unfamiliar to them, they frequently draw comparison to things that are more familiar to them and more concrete in nature. They search their memories for something they know about that might give them (or create for them) some understanding of something that is unfamiliar. Once the comparison is drawn, people then try to understand one thing in terms of another (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Hudson, 2007; Houghton, 2009).

People routinely use several mechanisms to bring order to complexity, resolve ambiguities, and comprehend new situations. Many of these mechanisms rely on comparisons. Analogical thinking is one such type of comparative thinking (e.g., the “Munich analogy”). Metaphorical thinking is another cognitive process based on comparisons in that it involves viewing one phenomenon as being like another. The key difference between analogies and metaphors is the nature of the comparison being made. Analogies are generally comparisons drawn from the same realm of experience, whereas metaphors tend to be comparisons between things from very different realms. Analogies are what we might clarify as “within-domain” comparison, while metaphors are “across-domain” comparisons. According to Shimko (1994, p. 657), the use of a metaphor involves “saying a thing is or is like something-it-is-not.” Similarly, Lakoff and Johnson (1980, p. 60) tell us that the “essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another.”

Mintz & DeRouen (2010, p. 22) view metaphors as “figures of speech that compare one thing to another, but go beyond mere comparison to suggest that one thing *is* the other.” Using the example of the metaphor “war on terrorism,” Oppermann and Spencer (2013, p. 43) state the central idea is that “Metaphors map a source domain, for example ‘war’, onto a target domain, for example ‘terrorism,’ and thereby make the target domain appear in a new light.” The discourse of the cold war was filled with metaphors. In fact, the expression “cold war,” coined by Walter Lippmann in the 1940s to characterize the emerging U.S.-Soviet rivalry, was actually a double metaphor itself, with both “cold” and “war” being used metaphorically. The most prominent metaphor during the Cold War was the domino theory, which informed much of U.S. global leadership in this period. This metaphor of “falling dominos” represented the potential spread of communism if it was not contained. The domino metaphor is but one illustration of the significance of metaphors in U.S. foreign policy since World War II, indicating a need for further study in this area. Therefore, the article examines the usefulness of the metaphorical approach, employing a case study analysis of foreign policy during the Carter Administration. The study begins by describing the evolution in metaphorical thinking by President Carter and his top two foreign policy advisers, National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and his Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. Then the study explains the policymakers’ stability and change in metaphorical thinking—both individually and collectively—throughout the course of the administration.

The Carter years are examined due to the scarcity of research on metaphorical analysis pertaining to this administration. Since most metaphorical research on the Cold War have focused on either prior administrations (i.e., Eisenhower through Ford) or later ones (Reagan and Bush Sr.), this study makes a substantive contribution in this regard. Theoretically, the study fills a partial gap in the literature by examining metaphors in U.S. foreign policy not only as rhetorical devices for communication and legitimatization, but also metaphors as cognitive devices that can serve as heuristics for decision-makers in developing foreign policies in complex environments. The research strategy for determining metaphorical images is based on a qualitative content analysis of multiple sources, including government documents, speeches, interviews, memoirs, and secondary sources. The findings indicate a change in metaphorical thinking from a more optimistic approach—“global community”—during the early years (1977/1978) to a more pessimistic one—the “arc of crisis”—in the latter years (1979/1980). In addition, this change in metaphorical thinking coincided with a shift in global leadership during the Carter years, reflecting a role for metaphors as cognitive guides through the foreign policy terrain.

## **2. Metaphors and Foreign Policy Analysis**

Metaphorical imagery has been especially prominent and significant in terms of U.S. foreign policy since World War II. The domino metaphor served as a virtual cornerstone for U.S. global leadership throughout much of the Cold War, providing a powerful cognitive and rhetorical framework for the development and expression of U.S. foreign policy. Furthermore, U.S. strategic analysis was frequently characterized by a manner of thinking and speaking that was an extension of the domino metaphor. Even when the specific metaphor was not being invoked consciously, it was not uncommon to hear policymakers employ the language of the metaphor—for example, nations and governments facing communist challenges were in danger of “falling” and “toppling,” the “fall” of one nation could set off a “chain reaction,” and friendly governments could be “propped up” with U.S. “support” (Glad & Taber, 1990; Shimko, 1995). The domino theory, which was misapplied to Vietnam (due partly to “wrong” lessons learned from Munich), was problematic due to its over-simplicity and invalid assumptions. Thus, metaphors contain generalizations—often tacit—about the characteristics of empirical objects and the relationships between them. U.S. officials are also influenced by their metaphorical thinking due to the central role and position of the U.S. in the world. Metaphors of the nature of the world order and the position of one’s own nation in that order play a key role in how decision-makers define their interests, the nature of the threats to those interests, and possible policy responses (Hanhimaki, 2012; Kalb & Kalb, 2011). Metaphorical thinking has the potential for dealing with the complexities of foreign relations by enabling a “mental excursion” away from the hard facts to other realms of thought and other disciplines that are somehow related. Such a digression appears to allow one to contemplate new perspectives from other experiences. In addition, psychological studies have examined the impact of metaphorical thinking under various problem solving situations. The findings attest to the greater insight into problems offered by metaphors and the resultant effectiveness of metaphorical approaches in aiding the solution process in comparison with other problem solving heuristics (Glad & Taber, 1990; Alden & Aran, 2012; Hermann, 2012; Beach, 2012; Renshon & Renshon, 2008). However, metaphors do not provide specific policy guidance, but rather general guidance or a conceptual lens.

They may serve to guide officials, but in doing so metaphors can oversimplify situations and blind officials to other considerations and creative thinking. Thus, metaphorical reasoning is used for problem framing (representation) but not for problem solving (as with analogies). Metaphors help to frame a problem; however, Shimko (1994) contends that the framing ranges from a more specific framing to a very general framing of the problem. Furthermore, the meanings and associations that are conjured up by metaphors differ, in that some metaphors conjure up a whole host of associations—e.g., “war”—while other metaphors are more limited—e.g., “dominos” (Shimko, 1995; Suedfeld, 2010). Foreign policy problems do not present their own solutions or policy choices; indeed, they do not even present themselves as “problems.” Decision makers frame issues as problems and go on to define what type of problems they are. How a problem is defined or represented in the minds of decision makers can be expected to influence how they choose to respond to the problem. To the extent that different metaphors embody contrasting images of how the world works, they will be consistent with different policies (Mintz & DeRouen, 2010; Jian-hua, 2010; Hermann, 2012; Yarhi-Milo, 2014).

According to Oppermann and Spencer (2013), metaphors “can be considered linguistic devices which influence and reflect the cognitive process of decision making...[and] they also are cognitive schemata which give an insight into the cognitive processes.” Overall, then, the role of metaphors in foreign policy are basically threefold. For one, they facilitate communication among policymakers—and between policymakers and the public—of distant political realities, thereby promoting some understanding of such phenomena. Second, metaphors are used by policymakers to justify policy stances/actions in attempts to achieve legitimization and garner political support among the public. Finally, metaphors reflect the content of beliefs/goals of policymakers, thus serving as cognitive frames and guides through the foreign policy terrain. This final role is the primary focus of the study in assessing the usefulness of the metaphorical approach in the context of the Carter Administration’s foreign policy. In the following section, the study describes the evolution in metaphorical thinking by President Carter and his top two foreign policy advisers, National Security Adviser Brzezinski and his Secretary of State Vance. Then the study explains the policymakers’ stability and change in metaphorical thinking—both individually and collectively—throughout the course of the administration.

### ***3. Optimistic metaphorical thinking (1977/1978)***

Global change and an increasingly complex international system were the major themes of the new Administration in its first year. The Carter Administration’s initial philosophy abided by an overarching, optimistic metaphorical vision of “global community.” This metaphorical view rejected America’s Cold War view of an essentially bipolar world in which U.S. foreign policy was driven primarily by the objective of “containing” Soviet expansionism and replaced it with a multipolar view. Thus, the dramatic global changes that were occurring ushered in a new international system containing a “new worldwide mosaic of global, regional, and bilateral relations” (Carter, 1977b, p. 622). Carter Administration officials perceived a very complex world, one in which interdependence and pluralism were facts of life that could not be ignored. The world was so complex that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union could control the destiny of the planet (Kaufman, 2008). In this new world the U.S. could lead, but it could no longer command or control. “However wealthy and powerful the United States may be—however capable the leadership,” stated President Carter, “this power is increasingly only relative. No nation has a monopoly of vision, of creativity, or of ideas. Bringing these together from many nations is our common responsibility and our common challenge” (Carter, 1977a). The complexity of the international system made mutual cooperation a prerequisite to building a global community. President Carter expressed this belief in a speech before the United Nations: We have already become a global community—but only in the sense that we face common problems and we share, for good or evil, a common future. In this community, power to solve the world’s problems—particularly economic and political power—no longer lies in the hands of a few nations. Power is now widely shared among many nations with different cultures and different histories and different aspirations (Carter, 1977a).

Therefore, the Carter administration, guided by an overarching metaphorical view of global community, replaced anti-communism with the promotion of human rights and preventive diplomacy as part of a larger goal to promote a new system of world order—a quest for global community. The principal architect of this quest was Brzezinski, as represented by his 1970 book, *Between Two Ages: America’s Role in the Technetronic Era* and his directorship of the Trilateral Commission. Brzezinski described his vision of what he meant by a global community before the Trilateral Commission on October 30, 1977: A secure and economically cooperative community of the advanced industrial democracies is the necessary source of stability for a broad system of international cooperation.

We are aware of the pitfalls...that leaves out the majority of mankind who live in the developing countries...At the same time, a wider and more cooperative world system has to include also that part of the world which is ruled by communist governments...(Brzezinski, 1977a, p. H12000). The Carter Administration sought to improve the world, attempting to promote a new system of world order based upon international stability, peace, and justice. Members of the Administration recognized that the effort to promote a more stable, peaceful and just international system would be difficult. President Carter realized that “we can only improve this world if we are realistic about its complexities. The disagreements that we face are deeply rooted....They will not be solved easily. They will not be solved quickly” (Carter, 1977c, p. 329). This was why the Carter Administration felt it was so important to work with others in resolving problems and building a global community. Mutual cooperation and preventive diplomacy were believed to be the basis for addressing important global issues and actors (Kaufman & Kaufman, 2006).

### **3.1 Images of the Soviet Union**

Fundamental to the Carter Administration’s pursuit of a global community was its perception of the Soviet Union, which was at first “viewed optimistically as a country with limited capabilities, occasionally opportunistic but basically cooperative and peaceful in its intentions” (Sneh, 2008, p. 192). Carter himself was especially sanguine about “the Soviets’ peaceful intentions; as a result, East-West and Soviet-American relations could be regarded in context with other world problems.” In addition to enhancing East-West relations, an improvement in North-South relations was very crucial for the Carter goal of promoting a global community. “We will cooperate more closely with the newly influential countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. We need their friendship in a common effort as the structure of world power changes” (Carter, 1977b, p. 622). Normalizing and generally improving global relations were considered vital for dealing with change in a complex world. In this vein, the Administration’s metaphor of “global community” represented an approach to foreign policy which embodied a “regionalist” explanation of conflict in the Third World. Disputes were not to be seen through a Cold war lens (which was the problem in Vietnam). Legitimate nationalist aspiration was not to be equated with communism, even if nationalist or separatist movements had Soviet backing. Carter held that, since Vietnam, “we’ve learned that this world...is too large and too varied to come under the sway of either one of two superpowers” (Nichols, 2002, p. 92). As a responsible superpower, the U.S. had an interest in and a duty to seek resolution of regional conflict. “However, in a complex world of limits, the U.S. must seek the assistance of allies and ‘regional influentials’—leadership is increasingly in need of being shared” (Carter, 1977a, p. 452). By the end of 1977 a combination of “global community” and “regionalist” statements appeared to presage a new era of “cooperative multilateralism” in U.S.-Third World relations. In this context, the global community metaphor served to facilitate communication and understanding of distant political realities.

While Carter, Vance and Brzezinski all shared an optimistic view of the Soviet Union at the outset, there were subtle differences between them. Carter and Vance were basically highly optimistic about a cooperative relationship with the Soviet Union, while Brzezinski was merely ‘hopeful’: “I think we’re [U.S. & Soviet Union] reasonably vigilant to the fact that the competition goes on and therefore we have to compete. But we are also very much aware of the fact that in this shrinking world the imperative of cooperation has become more urgent” (Brzezinski, 1977c). Brzezinski wanted to promote a cooperative relationship with the Soviet Union, yet he was more skeptical than President Carter and Secretary Vance concerning the sincerity of Soviet peaceful intentions. He believed that “just as the United States has gone through an imperialist cycle, and then waned, so it is my hope that the Russians will increasingly move into the world in a more cooperative, less imperially assertive fashion and begin participating in what is gradually, truly emerging: namely, a global community” (Brzezinski, 1977b). Thus, Brzezinski was both hopeful yet skeptical that the Soviet Union would play a cooperative role.

### **3.2 Change in Metaphorical Thinking (1978)**

These subtle differences in thought were outweighed by the degree of consensus among the three policy-makers as the second year of the Administration unfolded. However, this consensus began to show strain in early 1978 over the question of the appropriate U.S. response to Soviet logistical support given to Cuban and Ethiopian troops fighting against Somali guerillas in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia (the Horn of Africa crisis). Brzezinski wanted the U.S. to make a show of force by sending an aircraft carrier task force into the area. Vance and his advisers agreed that the Soviets were seeking to exploit a local situation but did not interpret the issue as one of U.S.—Soviet rivalry. Carter sided with Vance (Glad, 2009).

The Carter Administration's optimism concerning a complex international system and global change continued into its second year, although differences in individual metaphorical thinking clearly emerged. While President Carter and Secretary Vance adhered to the metaphor of global community, Brzezinski's metaphorical thought began to change, placing greater emphasis on political-military issues and the need to contain the Soviet Union's foreign interventionism. In spite of growing concern about Soviet behavior, Carter and Vance remained committed to their original view of the Soviet Union and saw the Soviets as opportunistic but ultimately failing. Brzezinski, on the other hand, became increasingly pessimistic concerning Soviet cooperation and the positive benefits of a complex international system (Daalder & Destler, 2009).

#### **4. Competing Metaphorical Representations (1979/1980)**

In 1979, the differences in individual metaphorical thinking of the Carter Administration regarding the international system sharpened. Although Vance continued to adhere to the view of a complex international system and remained optimistic concerning a new world order (the "global community" metaphor), Brzezinski perceived an increasingly fragmented and unstable international system open to Soviet interventionism (the "arc of crisis" metaphor). Carter at times shared Vance's optimism but also displayed pessimism more in line with Brzezinski's metaphorical thinking. Consequently, two competing metaphors existed in 1979. An analysis of the speeches of Carter, Vance and Brzezinski in 1979 reveals these differing metaphorical representations of the world. Carter generally shared Vance's optimism about the stability of the international system, with Soviet actions causing occasional eruptions of pessimism. Much of Carter's uncertainty was a function of his metaphorical thinking about the Soviet Union—he appeared to be increasingly torn between the cooperative and competitive aspects of the U.S.-Soviet relationship. Brzezinski, in contrast to Vance, described the USSR as the cause of increasing global instability. Rosati notes, "One still heard about the importance of promoting international cooperation and pursuing a global community, but those themes were overshadowed by Brzezinski's perception...." (Rosati, 1987).

For Brzezinski, the principal concern became the growing "arc of crisis", constituting a change in his metaphorical view from that of "global community". He believed the international system was not only becoming increasingly fragile and unstable, but that the Soviet Union was growing in power and willing to project that power globally. In his view, these two trends produced the "arc of crisis". He contended that the Soviet Union was at the root of the problem of global instability, emphasizing, metaphorically, that an "arc of crisis" existed in the Persian Gulf in Iran and along a line extending into southern Africa (Brzezinski, 1979c). Chaos and instability would result if the Soviet Union were able to successfully exploit the situation. Calling the region of "vital importance" to the United States, the NSC adviser warned that its fragile social and political structures had already led to power vacuums that "could well be filled by elements hostile to our values and sympathetic to our adversaries" (Brzezinski, 1979a; 1979b, p. 14). As Brzezinski's comment suggested, the regional turmoil was part of a broad clash of interests between Moscow and Washington and a general deterioration in Soviet-American relations. Key to Brzezinski's altered metaphorical thought was American troubles in Iran and in other parts of the Muslim world, which seemed only to multiply in the first few months after the overthrow of the shah in early 1979. Brzezinski later stated that: The Iranian disaster shattered the strategic pivot of a protected tier shielding the crucial oil-rich region of the Persian Gulf from possible Soviet intrusion. The northeast frontier of Turkey, the northern frontiers of Iran and Pakistan, and the neutral buffer of Afghanistan created a formidable barrier, which was pierced once Iran ceased to be America's outpost (Brzezinski, 1983, p. 356). Thus, throughout 1979 two divergent metaphorical views, represented by Vance and Brzezinski, competed for ascendancy within the Carter Administration. With Carter unable to adhere fully to either of the two competing metaphors, nor able to reconcile the differences between them, it was an incoherent metaphor that survived as a divided Administration entered its final year.

#### **4.1 Pessimistic Metaphorical Thinking Prevails (1980)**

The fourth year (1980) witnessed the termination of the Carter Administration's metaphorical vision of a global community, though Vance continued to fight for the "global community" metaphor up to his resignation. Global change was no longer seen to be positive. The predominant focus became the containment of Soviet expansionism and maintenance of the West's security in Europe, the Far East, and, of immediate concern, in Southwest Asia. Carter and Brzezinski were the major proponents of this new metaphorical picture of an "arc of crisis" in the international system (Brzezinski, 1980b; Carter, 1991).

Unlike the earlier years, when the emphasis was on positive change and an effort to create a new world order, the international system was now seen as turbulent and unstable. The “arc of crisis” metaphor was now perceived to be dominant in terms of an increasingly fragmented international system. Two events in particular overwhelmed the thinking of administration officials, especially Carter: the taking of American hostages in revolutionary Iran and the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan. No longer was the world viewed as being increasingly pluralistic. Rather the Soviet Union was now the dominant international actor, and U.S. foreign policy concentrated overwhelmingly on the Soviet Union (Kinch, 2006). The Soviet Union was considered the major destabilizing force in the world and a direct threat to the West. Brzezinski specifically argued that the Persian Gulf represented the “third central strategic zone”—after, first, Western Europe and the Far East—vital to the U.S. and the West after World War II that was under challenge by Soviet expansionism (Brzezinski, 1980a). Carter’s response to Soviet expansionism and its future threat was to reinstate the containment strategy to the forefront of U.S. foreign policy. Following the invasion of Afghanistan, the *Carter Doctrine* was enunciated (Zelizer, 2008). In sum, although a number of diverse issues were perceived to be important during 1977 (reflecting a more optimistic metaphorical view), by 1980 the Administration concentrated overwhelmingly on a much smaller set of issues, primarily of a political-military nature (reflecting a more pessimistic metaphorical view). In addition, the movement from actor diversity to concentration on fewer actors, especially the role of the Soviet Union, reinforces the description of the Carter Administration’s change in its metaphorical thinking from global community (pluralism and hope for greater international cooperation) to the “arc of crisis” (threatened global stability).

## **5. Explaining Stability/Change in Metaphorical Thinking**

The key to understanding the change in the Carter Administration’s metaphorical thought from global community to the “arc of crisis” is to examine the image of the three policymakers who comprised the collectivity. As the individual metaphorical views evolved, the Administration’s metaphorical thinking also evolved. Whereas Brzezinski and especially Carter experienced a great deal of change in their metaphorical thinking of the international system, Vance’s metaphorical view was relatively stable over time. Because determining why one person’s metaphorical thought was stable and another person’s metaphorical thought changed is extremely difficult, what follows is a brief explanation of the evolution of the three individual metaphorical views based on three interrelated factors: the individual personalities, the occurrence of major events, and the impact of domestic forces.

### **5.1 Change in Carter’s Metaphorical Thinking**

Over time, President Carter experienced the most profound metaphor change. The key factors that interacted to change his metaphorical thinking were his personal lack of knowledge in global affairs and open-minded personality, the crucial events involving the hostages in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the presidential election of 1980 during a time when the domestic climate was becoming more nationalistic. Indeed, Gaddis Smith echoes most of the above factors as leading to Carter’s transformation (and ultimate failure): Carter failed because he asked the American people to think as citizens of the world with an obligation toward future generations. But the clamor of political critics, the behavior of the Soviet Union, the discordant voices of his advisers, and the impossibility of seeing clearly what needed to be done—all combined to make Carter’s vision appear naïve. In 1980, he fell back on an appeal to the combative nationalistic instincts of the American people (Smith, 1986, p. 247). Carter had not developed many central beliefs concerning the nature of the international system when he assumed the presidency. Carter’s lack of knowledge was combined with a receptivity to new ideas—he had an intense desire to know more about the world. However, Carter’s experience level was still such that his central belief in human nature provided the guideposts by which he evaluated the world around him. According to Brzezinski, Carter’s personal philosophy was the point of departure for his foreign policy, and the central theme was a religious impulse to make the world more humane (Brzezinski, 1983, pp. 48-49). Another adviser recalled, “It’s part of the President’s background, his evangelism, that he did believe when he came to office that he could make the lions lie down with the lamb, that you could sit down and reason with people and get them to do what they ought to do....” (White Burkett Miller 1993, p. 62). Thus, Carter entered office with a genuine conviction in the boundless possibilities for relations among human beings. Quite naturally, this led him to harbor optimistic metaphorical thinking of many of the world’s actors, most notably the Soviet Union. “My intention,” he later explained, “was to cooperate with the Soviets wherever possible” (Carter, 1982, p. 218).

Therefore, whenever the Soviets acted opportunistically abroad and violated these behavior standards, Carter experienced periods of dissonance. Initially, he responded with surprise and confusion. As the pattern of Soviet behavior contrary to his expectations persisted, surprise and confusion turned to frustration and disenchantment. Two events—the hostage seizure in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan—compelled Carter to reassess his notions of the Soviet Union and the world. By the time he left office, Carter’s metaphorical imagery of the Soviets had been transformed from “global community” to the “arc of crisis”. The watershed was Afghanistan, the first combat use of Soviet troops outside of the Warsaw Pact area in Eastern Europe since World War II (Auten, 2008). In an interview with Frank Reynolds on ABC-TV’s *World News Tonight*, Carter confessed how the Soviet invasion affected him: My opinion of the Russians has changed most drastically in the last week than even the previous two and a half years before that. It’s only now dawning on the world the magnitude of the action that the Soviets undertook in invading Afghanistan...to repeat myself, this action of the Soviets has made a more dramatic change in my own opinion of what the Soviets’ ultimate goals are than anything they’ve done in the previous time I’ve been in office (Carter, 1980).

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979 had a more profound effect on Carter than any other unanticipated event in his administration. He felt personally betrayed in his efforts to win ratification of SALT II. The invasion “changed Carter as a person”, one of his closest aides thought. “It steeled and toughened him and made him more forceful, as seen in his retaliatory actions of suspending high technology sales to the Soviets, the grain embargo and the boycott of the summer Olympics” (White Burkett Miller, 1995, p. 65). “I was sobered...by our strained relations with the Soviets,” Carter later acknowledged, “but I was determined to make them pay for their unwarranted aggression...” (Carter, 1982, p. 476). The domestic environment acted to spur and reinforce Carter’s commitment to more pessimistic metaphorical thinking of the international system. The public became more concerned with the Soviet Union and America’s military capability. This trend was further promoted by the rise of the “new right” and neoconservatism. Numerous individuals and groups who argued for a stronger U.S. foreign policy based upon fear of Soviet communism received considerable attention and gained legitimacy within the political system. Nineteen eighty was also an election year, and the public agenda was basically defined by the political right. President Carter had to campaign for reelection in a domestic environment that was increasingly inhospitable to his earlier metaphorical view of the international system. Thus, the “arc of crisis” metaphor served to legitimize the Administration’s tougher policies and its responsiveness to public opinion (Nichols, 2002). President Carter’s new pessimistic metaphorical picture of the Soviet Union was consistent with the mood of the country. However, in the minds of most Americans the international prominence of the United States was considered to be at a low, and Carter was perceived to be a weak leader. Thus, the nationalistic environment surrounding the election not only promoted a change in Carter’s metaphorical thinking but also contributed to his lack of support for reelection (Zelizer, 2008).

### ***5.2 Change in Brzezinski’s Metaphorical Thinking***

Zbigniew Brzezinski’s metaphorical view of the international system also changed during the course of the administration. However, Brzezinski’s change is particularly difficult to explain due to previous modifications in his thinking and the integral role his personality played in forming his metaphorical thought. Prior to 1978, Brzezinski’s metaphorical thinking of the international system had undergone two other major transitions. A Polish immigrant and a prominent Sovietologist, Brzezinski developed a very pessimistic view during the 1950s and early 1960s of the Soviet Union. He saw communism as the major threat in a bipolar international system and the need for containment—consistent with the metaphor of “falling dominoes” (Gati, 2013). Then in the late 1960s and early 1970s, his thinking changed, and he joined those promoting the metaphorical view of a global community—best represented by his book *Between Two Ages: America’s Role in the Technetronic Era* (1970) and his directorship of the Trilateral Commission. This represented the metaphorical thinking with which he entered the White House. As noted above, Brzezinski was the least optimistic about Soviet activities from the beginning of the Carter Administration. Nevertheless, many people argue that he never shared a similar optimistic metaphor of the international system as did Carter and Vance—that he entered office with a pessimistic metaphorical view but initially was forced to assume a more optimistic one in line with the President’s preferences. Whether Brzezinski “privately” believed in promoting cooperation based on the metaphor of global community in 1977 is an open question. What is important is that he acted in “public” and as a “decision-maker” within the Carter Administration as if he adhered to such a philosophy (Rosati, 1987).

In other words, Brzezinski articulated optimistic metaphorical thought along with Carter and Vance, even though he was more skeptical about the Soviets' role within the international system. He continued to behave in this manner until the Somali-Ethiopia conflict triggered a change in 1978. Melanson's (1983) study of U.S. foreign policy during the Carter years arrived at the same conclusion, although based on a different method—interviews of Carter Administration National Security Council and State Department Policy Planning staff officials. The interaction of Brzezinski's personality and external events seems critical in explaining his loss of optimism. Brzezinski was noted for being extremely ambitious, and for having coveted a high-level foreign policy position within the U.S. government. Very attuned to elite opinion, he was often in the forefront of the most popular trends of thought in U.S. foreign policy, which may explain his abandonment of his early pessimistic metaphorical thinking and his commitment to the metaphorical view of global community in a complex world. However, Brzezinski was considered to have a large ego and to be terribly insecure (Daalder & Destler, 2009). Once he reached the pinnacle of power in U.S. foreign policy, Brzezinski found he no longer needed to conform to external opinion. In this sense, Alexander and Juliette George's (1956) personality study of Woodrow Wilson may prove helpful in understanding Brzezinski's evolution in his metaphorical thinking: as a "power-seeker" he was much more receptive to other people's preferences than as a "power-holder" (George & George, 1956). Brzezinski's intense personality made his primitive beliefs of a growing and expansionist Soviet Union particularly susceptible to arousal. When challenged by events in the Horn of Africa, memories of the past overwhelmed and shattered his optimism for the future—and the optimistic metaphorical image of a quest for global community was replaced by a much more pessimistic metaphorical image of the Soviet threat to the "arc of crisis" throughout the world.

### **5.3 Stability in Vance's Metaphorical Thinking**

Unlike Carter and Brzezinski, Vance's metaphorical thought was relatively stable throughout his 3 ½ years in office. He was by birth, style, temperament, character, and career, an exemplar of the old Establishment. A common characteristic of an individual raised within the foreign policy establishment is to avoid theatrics and operate at a distance from the public spotlight (McLellan, 1985). Therefore, Vance's metaphoric stability is difficult to assess because, although he was long on government experience, little is known about the man. Vance's experience with the Vietnam War appears to have been central to his thinking. While serving as Deputy Secretary of Defense under President Johnson between 1964 and 1967, he became increasingly pessimistic about the war. Yet, it was not until he officially left Washington that he realized how far the American public had turned against the war. The tragic consequences of America's intervention in Indochina dramatically altered and solidified his metaphorical thinking in a more optimistic direction—of the importance of resolving conflict and promoting a global community of greater stability, cooperation, and peace. This was consistent with his background as a lawyer and special presidential envoy to settle important conflicts in Panama, the Dominican Republic, Detroit (following racial violence), Cyprus, and Korea throughout the 1960s. Vance believed that negotiation and diplomacy were the key means of promoting conflict resolution (Vance, 1983). External events such as foreign interventionism in Africa, the Iran Hostage crisis, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan only reinforced Vance's belief in the need to exercise restraint and respond to the causes, not the symptoms, of the conflicts. The restoration of containment and militarization to the forefront of American foreign policy in the 1980s, and the specific decision to rescue the hostages against Vance's advice, left him with little choice. Three days before the military rescue attempt he submitted his resignation, becoming the first Secretary of State to voluntarily resign on a matter of principle in over 60 years (Kinch, 2006).

## **6. Conclusion**

The overarching and optimistic metaphorical thinking of "global community" in Carter's Presidency represented an imaginative and intelligent attempt to restore consensus and purpose after Vietnam, resulting in what some have termed the first post-Cold War presidency. Carter's new foreign policy was a sensitive and politically sophisticated attempt to respond to the erosion of American hegemony and to the rise of interdependence, although it naturally had contradictory outcomes: such as problems in arms control with the Soviet Union and achievements such as the Middle East Peace Accords. By 1980, another metaphorical train of thought—the "arc of crisis"—had effectively replaced "global community." The CIA was engaged in covert operations in Iran, Central America, Afghanistan and Africa, and the "Second Cold War" had begun. As evident in the above analysis, the change in metaphorical thinking made clear the changes in the Carter administration's policies, and by extension its global leadership role.



Metaphorical thinking, which reflected the content of beliefs/goals of policymakers, served as cognitive guides through the foreign policy terrain. Both metaphors involved their own set of heuristics, helping policymakers frame problems and develop foreign policies in complex environments. In addition, the metaphors facilitated communication among policymakers—and between policymakers and the public—of distant political realities, thereby furthering understanding of such phenomena. Furthermore, the metaphorical views were used by the Carter administration to justify policy stances/actions in attempts to achieve legitimization and garner political support among the public. Several implications arise from this study for future research on political leadership and foreign policy. For one, attention to metaphor usage by political leaders in foreign policy is important in order to grasp the leader's intention(s) and purposes. This would contribute to a fuller understanding of the political process in foreign policy. Second, metaphors may serve different—even overlapping—roles depending on the mix of international, governmental, domestic, and individual policymaker sources of foreign policy. Thus, multiple sources should be kept in mind when determining the role and/or meaning of a metaphor to avoid distortion. Finally, the power of metaphors in foreign policy should not be discounted or ignored. The above analysis attests to this, and further research is needed to more fully explore this phenomenon. In sum, the potential of metaphorical analyses for better understanding foreign policy and U.S. global leadership is considerable. Since relatively little research has been done in this area, many fruitful avenues of investigation remain open, which can shed crucial light on the meaning and power of metaphors in U.S. foreign policy—particularly as America embarks into the next millennium as a global leader.

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Carter's attempt at a foreign policy built on the principle of human rights also prompted much criticism, however. Many in his own administration were opposed to these initiatives, and the more assertive human rights policy of the Carter years was blunted. In 1982, though he had met with mixed results during his presidency, Carter established the Carter Center in Atlanta to advance human rights and alleviate human suffering. The non-profit, nongovernmental center promotes democracy, mediates and prevents conflicts, and monitors the electoral process in support of free and fair elections. It also works to improve global health through the control and eradication of diseases. South Korea. During his first month in office, President Carter cut the defense budget by \$6 billion. Finally, a successful foreign policy leader needs what theorists of business leadership call "contextual intelligence," the ability to understand an evolving environment and to match resources with objectives by moving with rather than against the flow of events. Contextual intelligence allows a leader to act on hunches based on informed intuition, what Bismarck once described as the statesman's task of hearing God's footsteps as he marched through history and trying to grasp his coattails. Although often faulted for his purportedly limited cognitive skills, Reagan had good contextual intelligence. The U.S. role of global leadership has resulted in extensive U.S. involvement in international affairs, and this, too, has been described with various phrases. The United States has been described as pursuing an internationalist foreign policy; a foreign policy. A second key element of the traditional U.S. role in the world since World War II "one that can be viewed as inherently related to the first key element above" has been to defend and promote the liberal international order that the United States, with the support of its allies, created in the years after World War II.