



Economics, Management, and Financial Markets 13(4), 2018
pp. 63–73, ISSN 1842-3191, eISSN 1938-212X

BOOK REVIEWS

A Research Agenda for Neoliberalism

Kean Birch (University of Toronto)

Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2018, x + 193 pp.

ISBN: 978-1-78897-618-3

In *Personal Knowledge*, Michael Polanyi famously describes concepts as cognitive structures (aka *gestalten*) capturing countless amounts of subsidiary details, from which we cannot but attend in order to apprehend each concept's distinguishing focus, i.e. their meaning under the given circumstances. Polanyi believes our awareness of subsidiary details to be severely limited, though by no means absent. Were our awareness of these subsidiary details altogether absent, then we would be unable to grasp their focal point; just like we would not recognise a face without having at least some awareness of the countless and, for the most part, indescribable features allowing us to see a face *and* to know to whom it belongs. As Polanyi explains, it is only in highly artificial settings that we make use of concepts for which precise, explicit sets of necessary and sufficient conditions can be listed, such as the axioms of the formal sciences, the definitions and protocols of the natural sciences, and the official criteria for judicial hermeneutics. Nonetheless, even in these highly artificial settings there remain fundamental concepts that are as fuzzy and as open-ended as ordinary concepts normally are, such as the guiding ideals of formal elegance, scientific truth and legal justice – not to mention the continued implicit reliance of logicians, scientists and judges on ordinary language in their more prosaic but inevitable endeavours and, *a fortiori*, on ordinary concepts.

Birch mentions Michael Polanyi three times in his book (16, 18, 27) but does not cite, refer to, or make any palpable use of Polanyi's work, with which Birch does not seem to be familiar at all (Birch seems instead familiar with the work of Michael's brother Karl; 113–114). Thus, Birch's whole book is built upon a 'non-Polanyi-esque' premise, i.e., that it should be possible to make complete and explicit sense of the concept of neoliberalism, which Birch himself has employed frequently in his own previous works and has yet grown more and more dissatisfied with, because of the many important

details that thousands – and growing – scholarly treatments of this concept regularly leave out, underestimate, overestimate, or relentlessly pile up into an unmanageable host of possible applications of the same. Under this respect, Birch sounds unaware of how concepts function, at least along the lines of M. Polanyi’s understanding. Certainly, Polanyi never denies the possibility of error in our cognitive activities, whether these concern perceiving, recalling, imagining or talking. Perhaps, neoliberalism is a mistaken concept – too vague, too broad, too narrow, or all of these things at once. Or maybe, Birch simply fails to realise that to “problematize” a concept such as neoliberalism (14, 35, 157 and *passim*) is akin to paraphrasing a poem or explaining a joke, i.e. to operate a shift away from the focus of a concept and down toward some of its subsidiary details, hence destroying whatever function that focus was meant to serve (e.g. to describe, instruct, delight, or amuse).

Mapping the indubitable proliferation of diverging usages of “neoliberalism”, Birch attempts himself a half-hearted account of this concept by offering: first of all, an overview of its intellectual history (chapter 2); then an assessment of its mainstream uses as well as of four key-thinkers belonging to the neoliberal camp (Hayek, Friedman, Becker, Posner; chapter 3); followed by a discussion of popular and scholarly critiques of neoliberalism (i.e. Foucauldian, Marxist, ideational, Mirowskian, institutionalist, regulationist, human-geographical; chapter 4); and by concluding with an account of commonly acknowledged conceptual and empirical ambiguities of “neoliberalism” in its theoretical interpretations and concrete manifestations (Chapter 5).

The result of Birch’s account is less than satisfactory, at least according to the book’s author. As a technical, analytical concept, “neoliberalism” is too broadly cast a net describing too vast a plethora of intellectual, economic and socio-historical trends of the past hundred years, allowing too many incongruities and unresolved issues to arise and filter through the net’s holes. Still, a few core elements of “neoliberalism” do get captured by the same net, even in Birch’s own candidly perplexed rendition, namely the steady emphasis of declared neoliberals on: (i) the centrality of free “markets” for economic prosperity; (ii) “entrepreneurship” as a paramount factor of production to be fostered socially; and (iii) individual liberty as pivotal to any flourishing society and as manifested in legally sanctioned inter-personal agreements and commutations, i.e. freely entered contracts between free individuals that aim at accomplishing mutually advantageous commercial transactions (103).

It is at this point of the book that Birch presents his “research agenda” (title) and deploys the most important critical considerations about neoliberalism. These considerations consist in unpacking the glaring “contradictions” between the three doctrinal core-elements highlighted above, as ambiguous and as multifarious in their manifestations as they may be, and

the concrete economic reality unfolded worldwide, but especially in the US, over the past five decades (103). Specifically, Birch remarks on how: (i) monopoly (or oligopoly) and massive trade within corporate structures (instead of between them) dominate business life (chapter 6); (ii) rent-seeking and the claims of unearned income characterise the economic behaviour of those who are fortunate enough to enjoy access to capital, rather than entrepreneurship (chapter 7); and (iii) long-term, all-or-nothing, complex and effectively non-negotiable “standard contracts” imposed *de facto* by “sophisticated” business entities are the norm in commercial relations (169), i.e. most assuredly *not* time-specific, truly negotiated agreements understandable to all the parties involved, reflecting the wills and interests of free individuals making free choices (chapter 8).

Birch’s book offers a synthetic introduction to neoliberalism in general and, on a more specific note, to the ways in which left-leaning social scientists like Birch have been using this notion in recent decades, i.e. “how *we* understand neoliberalism” (1; emphasis removed and added). Birch’s book sends also a warning call to his colleagues, whom he believes to have been far too prone to rely on a rhetorically charged notion that turned from a proud self-descriptor into a dubious “pejorative term in the 1980s” and that is now far too commonplace and polysemic to be analytically apt (6). Students and scholars who have already been exposed to a modicum of literature and reflection on the history and ideology of neoliberalism or that, for one, may have happened to read the later works of John Kenneth Galbraith, are unlikely to find much that is new in Birch’s book. Those who have not, however, can benefit considerably from it. Birch is honest and direct on this point: as concerns the history and many meanings of neoliberalism, as well as regards the critical points that he himself makes, “others have got there long before [him]” (2). Similarly, Birch does not shy away from the fact that the overall “intellectual” depth of his work is fairly limited: more serious “excavations” are left frankly “to others” (22). The regular choice of recent – if not even “forthcoming” (181) – Anglophone sources from run-of-the-mill political and social sciences, sometimes *in lieu* of primary ones, further testify to his book’s self-admitted limitations. (Rare are even the instances in which Birch retrieves and cites, or at least refers to, older Anglophone classics, e.g. Veblen, Coase, Berle & Means.) In our age of boundless narcissism and shameless (entrepreneurial?) self-promotion, Birch’s humble tone is both noteworthy and commendable.

The Idea of Socialism: Towards a Renewal

Axel Honneth (Goethe University Frankfurt)

Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2017, x + 145 pp.

ISBN: 978-1-5095-1212-6

Faced with the threat of mass extinction, outraged by financial oligarchs' global larceny, and terrified by growing levels of inequality and precarisation, the world's masses seem unable to unite under the banner of "socialism" and aspire to radical international rejuvenation (vii). Quite the opposite, "the ethical force of the future" appears to be the long-mistreated "religion" of our forefathers, while "socialism is regarded as a creature of the past" (vii–viii). What happened? And can socialism ever regain some of its lost clout?

Honneth's book aims at answering these two interrogatives. In order to address the former, Honneth offers a concise and well-informed account of the history of socialism (chapters I & II). To address the latter, he identifies and discusses some possible "paths of renewal" (chapters III & IV), which are explicitly reminiscent of the libertarian socialist tradition of "*Socialisme ou barbarie*" and "Cornelius Castoriadis" in particular (52). Honneth's insights start already in the book's introduction, however, in which he argues that the peculiar "disconnect between" 21st-century people's "outrage" and their "vision of a better world" could be the result of three main factors (1): "the collapse of communist regimes in 1989", which weakened the notion of a viable "alternative to capitalism" (2); the cultural influence of "postmodernism", which rejects the linear and progressive interpretation of history fuelling much of socialism's appeal (2); and the quasi-mystical "[r]eification... of capitalism" into the given structure of the world: "a fetishistic conception of social relations." (5)

As regards the history of socialism (chapters I & II), the little-known roots of the term itself belong to "Catholic theologians" of the 18th century, who "referred to a tendency in the works of Grotius and Pufendorf" to assume that "the legal order of society should be founded on the human need for 'sociality' rather than divine revelation." (6) Better known is the use of this term by 19th-century Owenites "in England and the Fourierists in France", who were horrified by "the misery of the working masses" under the prevailing "economic sphere", which had clearly betrayed the melioristic aspirations of "the French Revolution" (7–9). Within the revolutionary motto, "liberty" and, above all, "fraternity" played a key-role in their understanding and policy plans, which included novel "forms of production and distribution... to ensure that production serve the moral purpose of stripping the liberty proclaimed by the French Revolution of its merely private and self-interested character" (12–13). Honneth cites Durkheim, Saint-Simon, Proudhon, Blanc and "[t]he young Karl Marx" among such socialists, stressing the influences of Rousseau, Hegel and Feuerbach in their reformist or revolutionary plans

aimed at bringing about human communities in which “mutual responsibility and sympathy” can be the decisive “modes of behavior” (16–24).

Honneth’s historical account shows how “the normative intuitions of the early socialists went far beyond traditional conceptions of distributive justice” and involved profound changes in the economic, political and cultural institutions, because only through such alterations of the status quo can emerge “communitarian life-form[s]” in which “an atmosphere of mutual sympathy” may prevail (27–29). The preconditions for such alterations were already in place, according to all socialists, whether reformist or revolutionary: the frustration and resentment of oppressed working men and women; the dismay and shame of many employers; and the crisis-prone character of the capitalist order, which suggested the necessity of its transformation. The empirical study of the working class conducted, *inter alia*, by Weber and “the early Frankfurt School” will show, however, that 19th-century socialists were possibly the victims of over-optimism, which affected also their progressive interpretation of history – itself a legacy of liberals such as “Turgot and Condorcet” (40–42).

In chapter III, Honneth takes his first stab at a “post Marxist form” of socialism that may be viable and successful in the 21st century. Specifically, it comprises revisions to the “reconstruction of the economic system” envisioned by earlier socialists and to their conception of “a future fraternal society” based upon “social freedom within the economic sphere” alone (53–55). On the one hand, Honneth is open to the possibility of social “experimentation” highlighted in the 20th century by John Dewey: there is an openness to market structures, “civil society”, and State power that socialists have historically underestimated or even excluded *a priori* because of a deterministic outlook (58–59). Then, along the line of the later Frankfurt School to which he belongs, Honneth stresses the importance of participative “communication” among social groups of all kinds and citizens at large as the fundamental engine of social experimentation, ideal as well as practical or institutional (61). Open, open-minded and open-ended debate and deliberation are key to non-violent experimentation in social possibilities, which are hampered mostly, “today just as in Marx’s day”, by the unimaginative and dogmatic orthodoxy of economics, whose adherents have been seeking “for over 200 years to justify the capitalist market as the only efficient means for coordinating economic action” – and in a fairly restrictive interpretation of the capitalist market itself (67). Yet alternative conceptions and actual historical experiments have abounded over the same 200 years. With regard to the former, Honneth mentions K. Polanyi, A. Etzioni, A. Hirschman, F. Kambartel and E.O. Wright. With regard to the latter, he mentions various forms of nationalisation and socialisation “of the means of production”, “consumption collectives”, trade “union... experiments under real conditions”,

“social legislation” of “the labor market”, “co-determination” on the workplace and “minimum wages” (70–73).

Finally, in chapter IV, Honneth takes a second stab at a post-Marxist form of socialism that may be viable and successful in the 21st century. Honneth starts by criticising traditional socialism for not taking full account of important functional differentiations preventing their ideal of “social freedom” to adapt to “the reality of a functionally differentiated society” (77). These differentiations include: morals and law, the social and the political spheres, the “public” one and the “private” one, “the economy and the state”, men and women (79–85). Not only were earlier socialists superficial in their acknowledgment and study of them. With Marx, they also came to reduce them all to the economic sphere, thus producing a picture or reality, and plans for action therein, that were largely inadequate and marked by a deeply illiberal streak of “determinism” (87). These functional differentiations are a fact; hence they must be fully recognised and studied. However, they are social, not natural facts; *a fortiori*, societies can and should be able to reconsider them and experiment with them, rather than reifying them into presupposed eternal structures of human associations.

By means of “free cooperation”, societies can tinker and tweak “the economic system”, “democracy and personal relationships” so as to approach the ideal of genuine “social freedom”, namely a condition under which each person interacts on a par with his or her peers without threat of “coercion and influence”, for the sake of the common good (89–90). Analogously to a complex living and thinking organism, rather than some kind of machine, societies can adapt to changing circumstances, grow, learn, reflect and experiment, seeking maximal social freedom by “a process of communication which is as unrestricted as possible.” (96) Thus, Honneth concludes by describing the specific chief circumstances of today’s world, in which the economy is largely “global”, “family” and personal life is not, and democratic self-determination somewhere in the middle (100). Capitalism is here to stay, according to him, but democratic institutions can be utilised effectively to modify it, while emancipation and experimentation in personal life can serve as a tangible token of the kind of freedom the new socialists should aspire to.

Honneth’s 2015 book, effectively translated by Joseph Ganahl for its 2017 English-language publication, is unsurprisingly well-written, informative and interesting. Its author is, after all, today’s leading member of the Frankfurt School and a major figure within contemporary Continental political thought. Whether the socialism it depicts and proposes can inspire today’s masses in the same pervasive and persuasive ways in which its criticised pre-1989 forms did, it is a question that only future history will answer. As a student of these matters, I am inclined to believe that, devoid of the eschatological, prophet-driven, mass-ritualistic and, in short, quasi-religious character of several of its earlier versions (e.g. Owenism, Saint-Simonianism, Marxism-

Leninism, Trotskyism, Maoism), its appeal is bound to be a limited affair, which might not “win [world citizens] over for [Honneth’s] project” any time soon, but a handful of well-meaning academics (101). The gross inequality and the species-threatening ecological collapse visible in today’s global society call for solutions that participatory communication can perhaps facilitate. However, the sheer psychological pressure of the former problem and the sheer magnitude of the latter, combined with their urgency, may actually call for some more ruthless solution. As unappealing as they may sound, ‘eco-Leninism’, ‘eco-Stalinism’ or ‘eco-Maoism’ might be what is needed, at least in the short- and medium term – and still from a socialist perspective (e.g. China’s top-down, fast and conspicuous strides towards becoming the world’s leading green economy). Let us save the planet and make a decent life possible for all, first of all. Then there may be time for fluid, democratic, dialogical experimentation.

The Cordial Economy – Ethics, Recognition and Reciprocity

Patrici Calvo (Universitat Jaume I)

Cham: Springer, 2018, xvi + 187 pp.

ISBN: 978-3-319-90783-3

Any standard textbook in economics starts with definitions that students must digest and internalise before being able to engage in economic research. Behind each definition lies a key-concept that must become part of the *forma mentis* of the acolyte. As Parkin, Powell and Matthews write in the preface to the 7th edition of their successful tome *Economics*, students must acquire “the economic way of thinking” about reality. All such key-concepts constitute fundamental assumptions about the world, indeed a veritable metaphysics, and some of them have a tenuous and dubious, if not grotesquely inadequate, empirical basis. Calvo’s book lists a number of them: “completeness[,] transitivity[,] reflexivity[,] continuity[,] monotonicity[,] convexity[,] independence[,] greed[,] insatiability” (24; emphases removed). In particular, his book tackles two of these assumptions, namely the greed and insatiability of the so-called *homo oeconomicus*, who acts for the sheer sake of self-interest and aims at accumulating indefinitely as much material wealth as possible – standard textbooks’ “self-maximising rationality” and “non-satiety”, in short.

First of all, the history of the idea of selfishness as the chief motive of human action is outlined and discussed in chapter 1, with special reference to the 18th-century thinkers who gave birth to modern political economy, namely the austere intellectual parent of economics. It is inside that older idea that the later axioms of greed and insatiability are rooted. The historical net that Calvo casts is ample and stretches from Hobbes and La Rochefoucauld in

the 16th century to “the axiomatization process of economics throughout the 1950s”, and mentions aptly Jevons, Menger, Walras, Robbins and Hayek (14).

Nevertheless, it is the century and the milieu of Mandeville, Butler and, above all, Adam Smith, that are crucial to the emergence of modern political economy and the *de facto* enshrinement of “psychological selfishness” *qua* prime motor of human agency in the philosophical anthropology of the West (2). It may be true that Adam Smith himself, as the author of the *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, would have objected to such a dismal step being taken, but that is precisely what Calvo’s account of the history of the idea of economic selfishness displays, as well as of the general reception, predominant understanding and selective reiteration of Adam Smith’s own much larger legacy (e.g. “the invisible hand”, 20; emphasis removed).

Secondly, in chapter 2, Calvo tackles the process of axiomatisation and formalisation that caused the assumption of selfishness *qua* chief motive of economic action to become even more remote from critical consciousness and intellectual scrutiny, yet all the more fundamental, central and pervasive in economics, if not in other social sciences too and, to a degree, the socio-political imaginary of contemporary world nations. Eager to present themselves as scientifically competent and maximally objective, 19th-century economists such as Jevons and Walras commenced a process of deductive mathematical formalisation of their discipline that has no equal in the other social sciences, which followed to a significant extent William Petty’s 17th-century plan for empirical inquiry by means of “Number, Weight, and Measure” (19). The cultural climate generating the process of deductive mathematical formalisation of economics is presented and discussed deftly by Calvo, focusing especially on the 19th-century history of logic and mathematics, the so-called “Hilbert programme” *in primis* (21–22; emphasis removed).

Aiming for pristine and awe-inspiring technical sophistication contained a droplet of awful poison, though. While great strides were made into making economic categories of thought amenable to the most demanding forms of mathematical manipulation, these categories’ very ability to describe accurately and meaningfully concrete human phenomena became increasingly uncertain. The already known shortcomings of what Schumpeter styled as ‘the Ricardian vice’ of political economy were, in short, intensified by classical economists, who have been erecting beautiful abstract models upon the basis of *homo oeconomicus*, as well as the equally ethereal “assumptions of perfect competition, perfect markets and perfect information” (46).

Thirdly, in chapters 3–9, Calvo addresses the many and vast critiques showing the utter empirical untenability of the axioms of greed and insatiability associated with the so-called *homo oeconomicus*. A plethora of disciplines and subdisciplines are recalled, outlined and discussed in order to prove this point. Calvo highlights evolutionary game theory (43–46), neural game

theory (46–51), socio-biology (56–62), evolutionary economics (62–68), humanistic economics (69–74), communicative action theory (79–82), reciprocal recognition theory (83–88), evolutionary anthropology (93–98) and child psychology (107–110). At the same time, the names of a few great philosophical giants of our past and of fewer early economists (especially Antonio Genovesi) are dropped too, since recognition of *homo oeconomicus*' astounding unreality is much older than the trendy studies favoured by Calvo in his book.

The common thread linking all these sources, as disparate in time and in disciplinary origins as they are, is the recognition of the intangible interpersonal preconditions for social life itself and, *a fortiori*, for any viable economic order and acceptable economic behaviour whatsoever. Moreover, Calvo shows patiently and painstakingly how these intangible interpersonal preconditions cannot be reduced to selfishness or not even to enlightened self-interest, if not at the cost of letting economics be aimless both descriptively and predictively – *pace* Friedman's clever but unwise attempt at making the "lack of realism" of "orthodox theory" irrelevant by claiming that its absurd assumptions are justified by the theory's predictive power (30).

Depending on the chosen sources, the emphasis is placed variously upon the economically crucial social phenomena of reciprocity, cooperation, motivational heterogeneity, altruism, moral feelings, social capital, communicative and affective relationality, solidarity, loyalty, recognition, fairness, justice, mutuality, bounded rationality, common goods, or – Calvo's own favourite – cordiality. The lesson to be learnt from all such phenomena is, *grosso modo*, one and the same: "what underlies failure or success in cooperation", including economic life, "are emerging, relational, communicative and emotional goods like trust, reciprocity, commitment, reputation, credibility or legitimacy." (136) Ignoring these goods in economic theory, which can be thoroughly devoid of them and yet as mathematically beautiful and as wondrously complex as the 19th-century physics from which it borrowed its formal apparatus, means missing the world that the scientist is supposed to study in the very first place. Today's physicists would not accept such a paradoxical outcome for the sheer sake of formal elegance; why should mainstream economists do it?

Finally, indirectly but effectively, Calvo hints all over chapters 3–10 at the enormous array of modifications and integrations that contemporary economics' conceptual armoury would be required to adopt, were the discipline truly interested in becoming able to take proper account of reality, particularly with regard to those intangible interpersonal preconditions for economic life that are revealed and related in the same chapters of Calvo's book. Again, the utilised sources are manifold and diverse, and include noted contemporary academics such as Sen, Zamagni, Cortina, Stiglitz and Ostrom, whose main achievement has been to produce enormous amounts of deductive mathe-

mathematical formal ingenuity in order to add – or merely try to add – to the body of orthodox economics some substantive notions that have been obvious to philosophers, theologians, literati, psychologists, anthropologists, sociologists, educators, parents and ordinary people for most of our history. Peaceful and constructive coexistence, virtuous habits, probity, generosity, kindness, friendship, love, mutual care, preferring niceness to nastiness, dutifulness, respect, civility, prudent friendliness in the face of uncertainty, humaneness and politeness are “cooperation problems” if and only if the opposite is presumed *ab ovo* (65). Fortunately, enough, mothers and fathers, school teachers, neighbours and fellow citizens are still prone to expect and cultivate the former array of behaviours, as imperfectly and inconsistently as they may materialise in daily life, rather than their opposite, which only orthodox economists, pirates and sociopaths would expect instead and, perhaps, even cultivate.

Chapter 10, under this respect, focuses on standards and measuring systems that exist in the real world and that exemplify the possibility of tackling at least some of the intangible interpersonal preconditions for economic life that mainstream economists still ignore, underplay or vainly try to reduce to selfish behaviour, e.g. “codes of ethics and conduct” (168), good-governance and corporate-social-responsibility “reports” and “audits” (169), “communication management mechanisms” (170), “whistleblowing” *qua* “monitoring” and feedback system (170), and public-sector “directives and standards” that steer economic activity towards the common good (175).

Calvo’s book is most informed and informative. Frankly and simply, it is an elegant token of competent scholarship. There is, however, something paradoxical in the approach and aims of his book. On the one hand, Calvo writes as though mainstream economics should and could be reformed and fixed at a great number of junctures, so as to become descriptively relevant and predictively plausible. On the other hand, however, Calvo’s account of the history of the discipline is a tale of wilful blindness at all such junctures, which are plentiful and often as old as political economy itself. Whatever wisdom the likes of Sen, Zamagni, Cortina, Stiglitz and Ostrom may have uttered, and whatever descriptive success may have been attained by specialists in evolutionary game theory, neural game theory, socio-biology, evolutionary economics and humanistic economics, the metaphysics of standard textbooks in economics has not changed at all, and the overall thrust of the discipline has held its course unflinchingly since Marshall’s day at the very least. (Curiously, Marshall’s name is absent from the cited references in Calvo’s book.)

For one, the much-celebrated Keynesian revolution of the 1930s and 1940s ended up being accommodated and emasculated in its most critical aspects (e.g. Keynes’ methodological objection to life-blind and mind-numbing mathematical models, and “the euthanasia of the rentier” that he

advocated), if not even marginalised by the emergence and success of simplistic “neo-liberal” trends after the 1970s (46). For another, not even the enormous brainpower and mathematical aptitude with which Sen, Stiglitz or Ostrom have tried to make their own discipline less dogmatically self-castrating has left a noticeable dent. The same could be said of earlier critiques, which Calvo either ignores or mentions only marginally, such as Sismondi’s, Marx’s, von Schmoller’s, Veblen’s, Sraffa’s, Robinson’s, Schumacher’s and Galbraith’s (in point of fact, only the last name is cited in the book: 32.)

Calvo is not at fault; or better, he is, but comprehensibly so. The realisation of orthodox economics’ utter inability to gauge reality in any genuine and useful manner is so daunting that only few professional economists have ever acknowledged it openly and acted consistently upon it, i.e. by abandoning mainstream economics and devoting themselves to either another field of study (e.g. Vilfredo Pareto’s eventual switch from economics to sociology), or to the development of an alternative approach to economic phenomena (e.g. John Kenneth Galbraith’s eclectic institutionalism, Deirdre McCloskey’s rhetorical economics, Steve Keen’s post-Keynesian economics). Considering the enormous amount of time and effort that a person must devote to the sheer acquisition of the metaphysical framework of orthodox economics, the incredibly sophisticated attendant mathematical apparatus (which has changed considerably over time and keeps growing), and the subjective task of making a career out of it in a self-preserving partisan context, the notion of admitting to its overall inadequacy and doing something else altogether must be overwhelming to most of its adherents. (Calvo is not among them, since he is a business ethicist.) Orthodox Ptolemaic astronomers and Aristotelian physicists must have faced a similar problem in the 17th century, or mainstream phrenologists in the 19th.

*Giorgio Baruchello,
University of Akureyri*

A Research Agenda for Neoliberalism. 9781786433589 Edward Elgar Publishing. Elgar Research Agendas. Kean Birch, Associate Professor, Department of Geography, York University and Senior Associate, Innovation Policy Lab, University of Toronto, Canada. Publication Date: 2017 ISBN: 978 1 78643 358 9 Extent: 208 pp. With an ever-expanding variety of perspectives on the concept of neoliberalism, it is increasingly difficult to identify any commonalities. This book explores how different people understand neoliberalism, and the contradictions in thinking of neoliberalism as a market-based ethic, proj A Research Agenda for Neoliberalism book. Read reviews from world's largest community for readers. Elgar Research Agendas outline the future of research ... See a Problem? We'd love your help. Let us know what's wrong with this preview of A Research Agenda for Neoliberalism by Kean Birch. Problem: It's the wrong book It's the wrong edition Other. Details (if other): Cancel. Thanks for telling us about the problem. Return to Book Page. Not the book you're looking for? Preview " A Research Agenda for Neoliberalism by Kean Birch. A Research Agenda for Neoliberalism. by. Kean Birch. 2.50 Rating details. 2 ratings 1 review. Elgar Research Agendas outline the future of research in a given area. no relationship research usage personal opinion research material components proposals and assistance relationship between researchs to provider of collection from papers to their authors from creators to their collections from organization to staff people from people to organizations from authors to their papers to out-of-date versions from papers to cited materials to relative materials to organization. To filter out some types of linkages click on its name in tables at the left. Press Ctrl and click for multi-selection or unselect. {0}. x.