

The Concept Peace¹

GEOFFREY DARNTON,
Peace and Conflict Research Programme,
University of Lancaster

1. Introduction

This paper is intended to be neither complete nor systematic. It is not a report of research done, or a simple proposal for future research, but a collection of information, thoughts, and ideas which I hope will eventually become a more thorough piece of work.

Talk of war and peace has been common, probably for as long as there has been speech. However, what is "peace"? In reading literature about war and peace, I have been particularly impressed by the lack of sophisticated images of what a peaceful world could be like. There is often reference to the absence of war or violence, and occasionally reference to such phenomena as "social justice". Much work within peace and conflict research is concerned primarily with war or conflict research, and I have also been impressed by the quantity of peace research which does not employ the word "peace", or generate any image of peace. The traditional argument that it is necessary to know the "causes" of war and violence before trying to develop any kind of "peace" will be examined in greater detail later in this paper. And finally, those works which I have looked at which mention "peace" seem to be very simple in terms of the images presented. This paper briefly examines some of these points, and suggests possible ways of examining the underlying problems in greater detail.

2. Early peace plans

The first step in trying to understand the word "peace" could be to look at some other works on the subject. It is interesting that talk about peace has been relatively constant in Europe for the past few hundred years at least. More specifically, there have been several "peace plans" which have been considered by many people to be "Classics" in the sense of being forerunners in thinking about peace. I shall briefly examine some of these plans to try and discover what the peace designers had in mind when talking about peace. It is not my aim to present criticisms of these plans, except perhaps on a very general level; there are already many good critiques of the plans. I will try and identify some of the factors which were considered important by the writers of the plans. This should not be interpreted as a claim to be carrying out a systematic survey of peace plans; it is merely an exploration. My selection [*p106*] of material for study has been governed by circumstance rather than choice, because the majority of books I would need for a systematic study are out of print and very difficult to obtain from libraries. Therefore, in some instances, I have had to rely upon either second-hand information, or not deal with an author at all. I have chosen two "histories of peace" to examine which peace plans are considered to be important. I shall then look at some of the plans (again, the selection will be determined by

¹ Suggested citation:

Darnton, G. (1973) *The Concept Peace*, in *Proceedings of the International Peace Research Association Fourth Conference held in Bled Yugoslavia, 22-25 October 1971. pp105-116.* Original pagination is indicated by a symbol (e.g. [*p106*]) to show the beginning of each page in the original printing.

circumstance rather than choice) from the point of view of the development of peace thinking. The two "histories" chosen are:

Hemleben: *Plans for world peace through six centuries* (1943)

Beales: *The history of peace* (1931)

Hemleben's book is quite a good systematic account of many of the classical peace plans. The ones he looks at are:

(1) *Early peace plans*

Author(s)	Title	Date (modern)
Pierre Dubois	<i>De recuperatione Terre Sancte</i>	c1306 (1891)
Dante Aligheri	<i>De Monarchia</i>	c 1310 (1879)
Marsiglio of Padua and John of Jandum	<i>Defensor pacis</i>	1324 (1928)
George Podebrad		c1460 (1919)
William of Ciervia and John Sylvagius		1513
Erasmus	<i>The Complaint of Peace</i>	1517 (1813)
Emeric Cruce	<i>The New Cyneas</i>	1623
Henry IV or Sully	<i>Grand dessein</i>	c1620 (1909)

(2) *Projects to the close of the 18th century*

Author(s)	Title	Date (modern)
Hugo Grotius	<i>De jure belli ac pacis</i>	1625 (1853)
William Penn	<i>An Essay towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe</i>	1693 (1912)
John Bellers	<i>Some Reasons for an European State</i>	1710
Saint-Pierre	<i>Memoires pour rendre la paix perpetuelle en Europe</i>	1712 (1714)
Rousseau	<i>A Project for Perpetual Peace</i>	1761
Jeremy Bentham	<i>A Plan for Universal and Perpetual Peace</i>	c1786 (1843)
Immanuel Kant	<i>Perpetual Peace</i>	1795 (1897)

(3) *Plans for the 19th century*

Author(s)	Title	Date (modern)
Saint Simon		
William Ladd	<i>American Peace Society</i>	1828
[*p107*] William Ladd	<i>An Essay on a Congress of Nations</i>	1840
Jay Bluntsehli	<i>War and Peace</i>	1842
	<i>Europa als Staatenbund</i>	1878
Larrimer	<i>The Institutes of the Law of Nations</i>	1884
Immanuel Kant	<i>Perpetual Peace</i>	1795 (1897)

(4) *Programs of the Great War period (1914-18)*

Author(s)	Title	Date
Boyce	<i>Proposals for the Avoidance of War</i>	1915
British League of Nations Society		1915
American League to Enforce Peace		1915
Fabian Society		
Union of Democratic Control		
Community of Nations		
Association de la Paix par le Droit		

The work by Beales is different in terms of purpose and content:

"This book is not Peace propaganda. It is a study of the historical development or organized efforts towards World Peace since the foundation of the earliest "Peace Societies" in 1815. My interest in the Peace idea was first stimulated by a second-hand copy of a life of Henry Richard which I picked up in 1926. I was surprised to find that every single idea current today about peace and war was being preached by organized bodies over a century ago, and that the world-wide ramifications of the present-day peace movement can be traced back in unbroken continuity to a handful of forgotten Quakers in England and America at the close of the Napoleonic Wars. Subsequent inquiries revealed that the story had never as yet been related in detail, though historians are working on particular aspects of the history of Peace." (Beales 1931, p. v.)

The two chapters of Beale's book which are of immediate interest here are the first two. A chapter entitled *Philosophical Theory of War and Peace* could be expected to be of great interest, but in fact it is rather disappointing. The following extract indicates the limited frame of reference for the use of the word "peace".

"The Peace Societies of 1815-16, then, were founded at a moment when Europe having learnt, as it thought, the lesson of the Napoleonic Wars, had re-modelled its political constitution; when there had just emerged into international practices a number of new habits which were capable of being moulded for the good of mankind; and when five centuries of isolated international thought had contributed a mass of literature from which could be extracted the five principles outlined above². All these realities were to serve as raw material for the reformers, who, though they coincided as a rule in choice of means, attacked their common problem - the eradication of war - from a number of incompatible stand points. Thus we shall find in the story of their labours, [*p108*] besides the inevitable checks administered by their opponents, hesitations and crises due to their own want of cohesion. But we will reserve final judgement until the story has been told." (Beales 1931, p. 15.)

Chapter Two of Beales' book covers roughly the same ground as Hemleben, in much less detail, but with more references:

"The evolution of Schemes for World Peace

1) To 1500

Early writers - Micah, Isaiah, Zeno, Seneca, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, Justin the Martyr, Tertullian, St. Martin of Tours.

Early pacifist sects - Albigenses, Vaudois, Lollards, Paulicians, Manicheans, Waldenses, Mennonites, Ananaptists.

Gerohus of Regensburg, Dubois, Marsiglio of Padua and John of Ja:ndum, Dante, George Podiebrod.

² Arbitration and Arbitration Treaties, An International Authority, The Codification of International Law, Sanctions, Disarmament.

2) To 1815

Erasmus, More, Sebastian Franck, William of Ciervia and John Sylvagius, Hemy IV (Sully), Cruce, Grotius, Memno Simons, Sozzini, George Fox, Robert Barclay, William Pen, John Bellers, Fenelan, Komenski, Leibnitz, Pufendorf, Christian Wolff, Addison, Swift, Pascal, La Bruyere, Montesquieu, Diderot, Vattel, AlberofTi, Chateaubriand, Saint-Pierre, Rousseau, Bentham, Kant."

The remainder of Beales' book is concerned primarily with the peace movement from 1815 onwards; therefore, discussion of these sections is not necessary here. The common ground of Hemleben and Beales is represented mainly by Hemleben's book.

It is interesting to note here that those "important" peace plans which are mentioned by Hemleben and Beales, and which are accepted by other commentators as important and/or relevant, are fairly well clustered from the point of view of time. It is also interesting to note that the time span of each cluster seems to increase over time. Table I presents this clustering.

The significance of this clustering becomes even more intriguing when compared with the clustering of major battles in Western Europe since the 15th century. The information concerning the battles may be obtained from Quincy Wright's *A study of war* (1942).

At present I am at a loss to interpret this information, but it is particularly interesting to note that the production of "peace plans" seems to precede and overlap with the commencement of an increase in the average number of battles per decade. However, since the end of the 18th century, the production of peace plans is not so well clustered, and there seems to be a more constant output up to the present time. It would be ludicrous to suggest that the output of peace plans causes wars, but they certainly fail miserably in stopping them. It might be reasonable to suppose that the increased output of peace [*p109*] plans is prompted by some fear of the consequences of contemporary activities. We should obviously beware of the increasing output of ideas about peace by people working in peace research! I shall briefly return to this point later.

Period	Plans
1306-1324	Dubois Dante Marsiglio of Padua and John of Jandum
1513-1517	William of Ciervia and John Sylvagius Erasmus More
1620-1625	Sully Cruce Grotius
1693-1712	Penn Bellers Saint-Pierre
1761-1795	Rousseau Bentham Kant

Table I. *Clustering of the output of peace plans*

Generally, the ideas presented in the "peace plans" are very simple indeed. The early ones were very much concerned with the expansion of "Christendom", and the unification of Europe under the Pope.

Some of the main points of Dubois' plan are:

- Advocacy of a federation of Christian sovereign states (with France playing the leading role!)
- The main undertaking of the federation was to be the recovery of the Holy Land.
- The federation should be governed by a Council of Nations which would resolve disputes by means of arbitration.
- The idea of referring disputes to arbitration was intended to relieve Europe of war, and thereby break the cycle of war producing war. This would release resources for the further development of European civilization, and provide more opportunities for progress.

In fact it is very difficult to know the real basis of Dubois' work because although many of his ideas may appear to be radical (for example the abolition of the temporal powers of the popes, and the confiscation of ecclesiastical [*p110*] property whilst still retaining the Pope as the final arbiter), there was also considerable compromise with contemporary thinking, such as advocacy of crusades and the use of arbitration³ In any event, I think it is easy to see that the idea of "peace" is very limited indeed. It may be that his comments concerning the usefulness of abolishing war in order to enhance the prospects of progress are too trivial to be of consequence. It does not need a highly developed intuition to realize that wars present a considerable drain on resources.

The basis of Dante's work (cl 310), *De Monarchia*, is much more explicit and gives some idea of his concept of peace. He also hints at methodological rigour as well as suggesting one of the main essences of sociological thought:

"Now, since every truth, which is not itself a first principle, becomes manifest from the truth of some first principle, it is therefore necessary in every inquiry to have a knowledge of the first principle involved, to which by analysis we may go back for the certainty of all the propositions which are afterwards accepted. And since this treatise is an inquiry, we must begin by examining the first principle on the strength of which deductions are to rest . . . (p.

3) . . . And again, since in matters of action the end sought is the first principle and cause of all⁴ (for that it is which first moves the agent to act); it follows that all our method concerning the means which are set to gain the end must be taken from the end . . . It is plain, therefore, that the distinguishing quality of humanity is the faculty or the power of understanding.

And because this faculty cannot be realised in act in its entirety at one time by a single man, nor by any of the individual societies which we have marked, therefore there must be multitude in the human race, in order to realise it: just as it is necessary that there should be a multitude of things which can be brought into being, so that the capacity of the primal matter for being acted on may be ever open to what acts on it. For if this were not so, we could speak of a capacity apart from its substance, which is impossible. (pp. 8-9).

It has thus been sufficiently set forth that the proper work for the human race, taken as a whole, is to set in action the whole capacity of that understanding which is capable of development: first in the way of action. And seeing that what is true of the part is true also of the whole, and that it is by rest and quiet that the individual man becomes perfect in wisdom and prudence; as the human race, by living in the calm and tranquillity of peace, applies itself most freely and easily to its proper work . . . Now that we have declared these matters, it is plain what is the better, nay the best, way in which mankind may attain

³ It is suggested by Stawell that arbitration was in common use at the time.

⁴ One fundamental principle of socio-cultural causality which distinguishes it from physico-chemical causality, and which is usually ignored by sociologists pretending to do causal analyses, is the importance of the values and socio-cultural meanings, which transform the significance of the material involved in a socio-cultural phenomenon.

to do its proper work . . . namely, the universal peace, which is to be assumed as the first principle for our deductions (p. 7)."

Dante then follows with expositions concerning the necessity for monarchies. His reasoning is understandable, but his conclusion could well be due to the confusion of personifying a system as a particular individual who holds some position of authority. Therefore, although he perceived the universe as comprising many levels of systems, he considered the functioning of the systems and sub-systems to be dependent upon a hierarchy of authority. His [*p111*] final sections are justifications for uniting the world under one emperor, whom God has shown to be Italian!

The remainder of the peace plans would appear to be primarily concerned with international relations and international law.

"In our study of the most noted peace plans of history we have seen the idea of a league of nations evolve from simple beginnings to the final complex organization created in 1919. The early peace plans were not only simple and highly unified but were conceived as panaceas to be adopted by the world as originally framed. These schemes were inelastic and were to be accepted intact by the world; they did not allow for change, which is the universal law of history

. . . . Hence, medieval plans reflected the prevailing idea of the unity of Christendom. Later with the growth of the national states, peace advocates proposed federations of kings and princes in which the representatives to the central government were to be the kings' ambassadors and were to do their will. With the coming of the age of democracy, peace treatises provided that the delegates were to represent the national governments, which in many cases were elected by the people and were responsible to them. In addition, recent schemes took into consideration the force of public opinion in the support of the peace proposals. To study the peace plans of history, therefore, is to study the historical development of the processes of government." (Hemleben 1943, pp. 182-83).

3. The word "peace"


The origin of the word "peace" is somewhat elusive, although, generally speaking, there is no difficulty in tracing the word through the Romans to the Greeks. It is also possible that part of the contact between the Greeks and India/Tibet gave the Greeks the word "pax", as it seems to correspond well with the Tibetan "pah-cio", which implies some form of tranquillity pervading the whole of nature.

My work on the concept "peace" in oriental literature is just under way, and although I am not yet ready to give detailed commentary, it would appear that the basic idea of "peace" stems from the importance of personal and individual tranquillity. It is by this means that the world could be at peace. There are certain similarities here with many doctrines of pacifism and non-violence also, where there is emphasis on the need for care in interpersonal relationships. However, Western doctrines of nonviolence and pacifism do not generally deal with intra-personal relationships, or with relationships between people and the rest of the environment or universe.

4. Basic relationships covered by concepts of peace

The brief outline above, of some of the approaches to peace, indicates that at different points in time and space, there has been a fairly wide coverage [*p112*] given to the application of the concepts. However, it would seem reasonable to categorize these ideas according to an individualistic-collectivistic, and a this worldly-other worldly dichotomy.

This may be represented as:




Examination of these dichotomies immediately suggests some extensions and problems. Firstly, the "Other-worldly" approaches to peace include theories about the relationship between life now, and life after death, or in heaven, or in another part of the universe; they also include theories about future points in time (e.g. utopias). The individualistic-collectivistic dichotomy is somewhat more problematic. In discussion about peace, or levels of peace, the notion of level is usually taken to be numerically indicated, from the point of view of different numbers of discrete biological entities called people. Sociology has yet to demonstrate that separate biological entities, people, are the effective basic units to be considered in analyzing sociocultural phenomena. Thus, up to the present, peace plans and ideas have been concerned with peace between individuals, or peace between nations or other aggregates of people. If peace is an emergent property of certain types of social systems or cultures, and as meanings are the most important distinguishing feature of sociocultural causality, then different kinds of people will correspond to different types and levels of organization. In more descriptive terms, if peace is an emergent property of certain types of social systems or cultures, and war is also an emergent property but of different types of social systems or cultures, and if the patterns of authority found in cultures which have so far been involved in wars are central to those social systems, *then* it is inevitable that peace plans attempting to employ the same authority patterns (e.g. nations, governments, kings) will fail. This point is central to my thesis.

5. *Peace, war, and causality*


Much work within peace and conflict research is concerned with the "causes" of war. Is it meaningful to talk of the causes of war? [*p113*]

The simplest representation of thinking about war and peace is a single continuum:



i.e. peace is considered to be the absence of war and/or the absence of war preparations.

There is another slightly more sophisticated representation which could also be used to represent some of the thinking about war and peace:



In such a system, war and peace are considered to be orthogonal. This is important, for it could mean that the causes of war and the causes of peace are to some extent independent.

There may or may not be the additional constraint that:

$$\text{if } W > 0 \text{ then } p = 0 \text{ and if } P > 0, \text{ then } W = 0$$

The presence of such a constraint would depend primarily on whether or not it would be meaningful to talk in terms such as:

$$P = aW + b, \text{ or, } P = f(W)$$

These kinds of thinking are common amongst politicians and military personnel, and surprisingly, amongst many academics in peace research, and are often well represented in common usage of the word "peace". For such people who use this meaning of peace, a situation which is "not war" may be considered to be peace. *Hence the definition of peace becomes entirely contingent upon the definition of "war" or "violence"*. There is, of course, considerable controversy concerning the nature of violence - let alone the "causes" [*p114*] of violence. Hence, most concepts of peace seem to involve some form of dialectic or independence between war and peace or violence and peace. (I suspect that this might be partly a consequence of thinking continually about "causes" of war and "causes" of peace).

It is indisputable that "war" and "peace" are generally used in the context of relationships between people or groups of people. Hence it may be reasonable to expect that war and peace are sociocultural phenomena in addition to being other sorts of phenomena. If we follow Sorokin's concept of sociocultural phenomena –

"Any empirical sociocultural phenomenon consists of three components: (1) immaterial, spaceless and timeless meanings; (2) material (physicochemical and biological) vehicles that "materialise, externalize or objectify" the meanings; and (3) human agents that bear, use and operate the meanings with the help of the material vehicles" (Sorokin 1943).

then it is clear that we cannot carry out any satisfactory causal analysis of sociocultural phenomena by only examining the intrinsic qualities of the vehicles used for the meanings. The meaning systems themselves must also be taken into consideration. Do studies of the "causes" of war satisfy the rigorous requirements of a study of sociocultural causality? Let us take, for example, the theories of the multiple causation of war:

"A typical example is Dean Inge's enumeration of the factors of war: pugnacity, plus artificial stimulation, plus pressure of the population, plus machinations of the government to distract attention from internal affairs and to stop a revolution at home, plus aggressive imperialism, plus fear, plus a drive for unification, plus something else. Aldous Huxley's multiple causation is as follows: geographic and climatic conditions, racial factors, economic factors, passions, wicked rulers, plus a series of psychoanalytical factors which he stresses as the most important .

. . . the slogan of multiple causation is very popular nowadays. We use it all the time as something quite definite, sound and unquestionable. As a matter of fact, the problem of multiple causation is neither clear nor unquestionable, nor is it free from serious logical and factual difficulties. One or two applications of the principle used in the above formulas of the multiple causation of war need to be mentioned specifically, as particularly fallacious. First, consider the factors which are incommensurable and which belong to profoundly different planes of phenomena are combined or even juxtaposed in accordance with the multiple principle . . . it is evident that they cannot be measured, or even roughly appraised in any comparative way; there is no measuring stick applicable to all of these. The very attempt to set up a classification of that type is one of the gravest of logical errors. It is a cloak that hides a profound ignorance, that prevents any understanding of the causes of war or of any other phenomena treated in the same way. In brief, such a use of multiple causation is logically impermissible. (Sorokin 1943, p. 25.) [*p115*]

Hence, although it might be possible to list events which take place before a war breaks out, usually, studies on the causes of war arbitrarily select certain events which are assumed to be the "causes" of war and ignore millions of other situations which exist before a war breaks out. For example, if it is the case that arms races may precede certain wars but there have been wars which were not preceded by arms races, then it would be difficult to conclude that wars are caused by arms races, without considering the conditions under which arms races do or do not precede wars.

Thus we come to the core of the conceptual problem with which this work is primarily concerned. Perhaps war and peace are not just phenomena "caused" by certain factors but are concepts for characteristics of total systems. In other words, perhaps war is a characteristic of certain sociocultural processes and systems, and perhaps the achievement of peace is dependent upon the designs of satisfactory alternative sociocultural processes and systems. If this is the case, then there is very good reasons for the absence of sophisticated concepts and images of peace: we, and most people on this planet, live in sociocultural systems which have war as a characteristic, therefore we will have a good intuitive understanding of some of the processes which can display war. A peaceful sociocultural system may therefore involve sociocultural systems of which we have no experience. If this is the case, then we cannot be expected to have an intimate knowledge of what a peaceful sociocultural system may be like. The task therefore is to examine to what extent these proposals are correct. A further task may be the design of alternative sociocultural systems. As meaning systems are essential characteristics of sociocultural systems and as meaning systems are independent of time and space, it may be possible to transform the material of the world by means of a transformation of meaning systems which could then be superimposed upon the world.

REFERENCES

- Beales, A. C. F. 1931: *The history of peace*. G. Bell & Sons Ltd., London.
- Bellers, J. 1710: *Some reasons for an European state*. London.
- Bentham, J. 1843: A plan for an universal and perpetual peace, in *The works of Jeremy Bentham*. Edinburgh.
- Cruce, E. 1623: *Le nouveau Cynee*. Jacques Villery, Paris.
- Dante, Aligheri (1310) 1879: *De monarchia*. Transl. F. J. Church. Macmillan & Co., London.
- Dubois, P. 1891: *De recuperatione Te"e Sancte*. Paris [*p116*]
- Erasmus (1517) 1813: *The complaint of peace, to which is added "antipolemus" or "The*

- plea of reason, religion, and humanity against war"*. Boston.
- Grotius, H. (1625) 1853: *De Jure belli ac pacis*. Transl. W. Whewell. Cambridge.
- Hemleben, S. J. 1943: *Plans for world peace through six centuries*. University of Chicago Press.
- Kant, I. (1795) 1897: *Perpetual peace*. Transl. B. F. Trueblood. Boston.
- Kapras, J. 1919: *The peace league of George Podebrad, King of Bohemia*. Prague.
- Marsilius of Padua (1324) 1928: *The "defensor pacis"*. Ed. C.W. Previte-Orton. Cambridge.
- Penn, W. (1693) 1912: *An essay towards the present and future peace of Europe*. American Peace Society, Washington.
- Podebrad, King of Bohemia (1460) see Kapras 1919.
- Pruitt & Snyder 1969: *Theory and research on the causes of war*. Prentice Hall, New Jersey.
- Rousseau, J. J. 1761: *A project for perpetual peace*. London.
- Saint-Pierre, C. I. C. de 1713: *Projet pour rendre la paix perpetuelle en Europe*. Utrecht (English ed. London 1714).
- Sorokin, P. A. 1943: *Sociocultural causality, space, time*. Duke University Press.
- Stawell, F. M. 1929: *The growth of international thought*. London.
- Sully, Duke of (1620) 1909: *The great design of Henry JV from the memoirs of the Duke of Sully*. Boston.
- Wright, Q. 1942: *A study of war*. Chicago. (Reissued 1964.)

NOTES

1. I would like to add my thanks to the staff of the Inter-Library Loans section of Lancaster University Library, without whose help this paper would not have been possible.
2. This version of the paper has been reformatted to A4 from the original conference proceedings paper - some tables have been reformatted, and page numbers have changed.

The ancient Greek concept of *eirēnē* (see the related English word *irenic*) denotes harmony and justice as well as peace. Similarly, the Arabic *salaam* and the Hebrew *shalom* connote not only the absence of violence but also the presence of well-being, wholeness, and harmony within oneself, a community, and among all nations and peoples. The concept of peace remains notoriously difficult to define, the foregoing passages notwithstanding. The difficulties in defining the concept of peace may partly be due to the fact that in Islam the concept of peace is closely connected to the idea of submission. Islam has particularly effective methods for guiding the individual towards attaining inner peace. The aim of Muslim adherents is to submit to Allah and in this submission peace is found. Muslims recognize that peace is not possible outside of a relationship with Allah. Submitting to the will of Allah is the only way of achieving peace with Allah. The Qur'an sets a clear path for Muslims to follow in their wish to submit to Allah. The concept of peace as a concept is seen through the lens of the fundamental problems faced by the world today: war, armed conflict and political violence. By insinuation, peace itself is understood predominantly as a negative concept, or as the absence of these phenomena (Atack, 2009). Martin Luther King said that "True peace is not merely the absence of some negative force - tension, confusion or war; it is the presence of some positive force - justice, good will and brotherhood" (King, 1957). Indeed, peace is a concept of societal friendship and harmony in the absence of hostility and violence. In a social sense, peace is commonly used to mean a lack of conflict (such as war) and freedom from fear of violence between individuals or groups. Throughout history leaders have used peacemaking and diplomacy to establish a certain type of behavioral restraint that has resulted in the establishment of regional peace or economic growth through various forms of agreements or peace treaties. Such behavioral restraint Today we celebrate the International Day of Peace. Although in many countries peace is still a far-away reality, it is not a reason to feel powerless. Peace is not only the absence of war, and whenever there is conflict, there can be peace. Here are 4 different concepts of peace, and how you can help achieve it. We should also take our time to think of the peace which we can contribute to, every day, around ourselves. Think about it: what is peace?